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REPORT ON GUARANTEES COVERED BY THE GENERAL BUDGET 
SITUATION AT 30 JUNE1993 
This report describes the situation as regards budget guarantees at 30 June 1993. 
It is in response to the statement made by the Commissio~ when the vote was taken on 
supplementary and amending  budget  No l/91,  that  it  would  report  to  the  budgetary 
authority twice a year on budget guarantees and the corresponding risks  .. 
.  . 
The Commission has already presented four reports to the budgetary authority. 
The report is in three parts: 
- . 
1.  Description of  operations entered in the budget and events since.the last report.· 
2.  Situation  at  30 June- 1993  as  regards  risks  for  the  budget  in  future  years· and 
guarantees already activated.  · 
"  3.  Assessment  of the  economic  and  financial-- situation  of non-Community  countries 
benefiting from the mosfimportant operations: - 3-
PART ONE:  OPERATIONS ALREADY ENTERED IN THE BUDGET 
At 30 June 1993  the budgetary autpority had authorized 21  headings with token entries 
in the  1993  budget,  including  six  new headings  for operations in favour of Bulgaria, 
Romania, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania and Effi loans in non-member countries.  These 
headings  can  be  divided  into  three  categories:  borrowing  and  lending  within  the 
Community,  borrowing and lending  outside the· Community  and  guarantees given  to 
financial institutions.  -
L  BORROWINGS TO BE ON-LENT WITHIN THE COMMUNITY 
A.  COM:MUNITY  BORROWING  OPERATIONS  TO  PROVIDE  BALANCE-OF-
PAYMENTS SUPPORT 
The  Community  is  authorized  to  borrow  on  the  capital  markets  or from  financial 
institutions and make the sums rai~ed available to Member States experiencing temporary 
balance-of-payments difficulties. 
The outstanding amount of loans granted to Member States for this purpose may not 
exceed ECU 14 billion in principal. 
At 30 June 1993 there were two operations in respect of Greece under the decisions of 
9 December 1985  and 4 March 1991  and  one operation in  respect of Italy under the 
decision of 18 January 1993.  · 
At 30 June 1993 the amount outstanding was 'ECU 1.200 million in loans to Greece and· 
ECU 1 979 million in loans to Italy (Table 1  ). 
B.  EURATOM BORROWING OPERATIONS 
In 1977 the Commission was empowered to borrow funds to be used to help finance 
nuclear power stations. 
Loans are made to electricity producers and carry the usual guarantee demanded by 
banks.  Recipients  are often  State-owned  companies  or companies  enjoying  a  State 
guarantee. 
The  maximum  amount  of  borrowings  authorized  is  ECU 4 billion,  of  w:hich 
ECU 500 million  was  authorized  by  the  1977  decision,  ECU 500 million  in  1980, 
ECU 1 billion  in  1982,  ECU 1 billion  in  1985  and  ECU 1 billion  in 1990.  At 
30 June 1993 the amount ofloans granted came to around  ECU 2 900 million. 
At 3 I June 1993 the total ofloans outstanding was ECU 1 144 million. 
On 9 December 1992 the <;ommission proposed that the balance of  borrowings not used 
in  the Member  States  could  be used to finance  the improvement  ot' the  degree of 
efficiency and safety of nuclear power stations  ~n the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe and in the CIS. 
Some ECU 1 100 million could be allocated. 
--... 
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C.  BORROWING OPERATIONS FOR THE PROMOTION OF INVESTMENT IN 
THE COMMUNITY 
-
The Commission was empowered by a Council Decision of 16 October 1978 to borrow 
funds  to. be  used  to· promote  investment  in  the  Community  (New  Community 
Instrument).  - · 
The  authorized  borrowing ceiling  was  -fixed_ at ECU I billion  by  the  Decision. of 
16 October 1978 .  and · was  then  raised  by  ECU 1 billion  by  the  Decision  of 
15 March 1982.  The ceiling  was further  raised. by  ECU 3 billion  by the Decision. of 
19 April  1983 and by ECU 750 million by the Decision of9 March 1987  . 
The proceeds of the. operations are paid out  in  the fonn of loans granted by the EIB, 
acting for the Commission, to finance  investment projects which  contribute to greater 
convergence and  growing integration  and  are  consistent  with  the  priority  Community 
objectives  in  the  energy, industry· and  infrastructure .sectors,  taking  account  of such-
factors  as  the regional  impact of the projects and  the need. to combat unemployment. 
Supp<;>rt  for  small  businesses  was  also  made  a  priority _objective  by  the  Decision  of . 
26 -April  1982.  -
·A Decision of 20 January 1981  also  empowered  the  Community to contract  loans  in 
order to provide exceptional aid of ECU 1 billion to the regions of Italy affected by tbe 
earthquake  of November 1980.  A  similar  decision  involving  ECU 80 million  was 
adopted on 14 December 1981  for .the _regions  affected by the earthquakes in  Greece in -
February/March ·1981. .  ·  - .  ·  ·· 
The maximum amount of  borrowings authorized thus _comes to ECU 6_830 million. 
At  30 June I 993  the  total  outstanding 'was  ECU 2 813 million,  15.4% less  than  on 
31 December 1992:  .  ·  .  - -.  - .  . 
The risk is spread over a large number of  borrowers.  In addition, most of  the loans are 
global loans to financial institutions which guarantee repayment of  the funds. 
Every year the EIB provides the Commission with a list of  debtors who, according to its 
infonnation, risk defaulting in the coming year.  So far,  no names have. been recorded on 
this lisf  ·  · 
D.  LOANS  RAISED  FOR  ON-LENDING  TO  .. NON-COMMUNrrv 
COUNTRIES 
A.  PROGRAMME..OF  BORROWINGS  CONTRACTEQ·BY THE  COMMUNITY 
TO PROVIDE MEDIUM-'-TERM  FINANCIAL  ASSISTANCE  TO  HUNGARY 
(Hungary I) 
.  . 
The Community is  granting Hungary a medium-tenn loan of up to .  ECU 870 million  in 
principal for a maximum offive years.  The loan is intended to facilitate the adjustment of 
the· Hungarian economy in  a  way  which  will- enable  it  to derive  all- the  benefits of a 
market-based economy.  It is being made,available in tranches. -5-
The first tranche of ECU 350 million was paid on 20 April  1990.  A second tranche of 
ECU 260 million  was paid  on  14 February 1991.  The third  tranche,  which  is  not  to 
exceed ECU 260 million,  was planned for  1992 but will  probably not be paid out' now 
that Hungary's balance of  payments is more favourable than expected.  The tranches will 
be repaid  in  one instalment after five  years and  interest,  which  is  at variable  rates,  is 
payable half-yearly. 
B.  ADDITIONAL  MEDIUM-TERM FINANCIAL  ASSISTANCE  TO HUNGARY 
(Hungary II) 
As the break-up ofthe Council for Mutual-Economic Assistance {Comecon) and the Gulf 
crisis threatened to compromise the initial encouraging results of  the reforms undertaken, 
it  was  decided  to  -launc~  a  supplementary  borrowing  and  lending  operation  for 
ECU 180 million under an overall ECU 360 million G-24 aid programme.  · 
The first tranche of ECU 100 million was paid on 14 August 1991.  It will  be repaid in 
one instalment  after  seven  years,  and  interest,  which  is  at variable  rates,  is  payable 
half-yearly.  The second tranche ofECU 80 million was due paid on 15 January 1993.  It 
wiJJ be repaid in January 1997 and interest, which is at a fixed rate, is payable annually . 
.  C.  BORROWING  CONTRACTED  BY  THE  COMMUNITY  TO  PROVIDE 
MEDIUM-TERM  FINANCIAL  ASSISTANCE  FOR  THE  CZECH  AND 
SLOVAK FEDERAL REPUBLIC 
As part ofG-24's total aid of  around ECU 750 million, the Commission, on behalfofthe 
Community, is empowered to borrow, in two tranches, ECU 375 million for a period of 
seven years.  The proceeds of  this operation were to be on-lent on the same terms to the 
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. 
The first tranche of ECU 185 million was paid on 14 August 1991.  It will  be repaid in 
one instalment  after  seven  years,  and  interest,  which  is  at variable  rates, . is  payable 
half-yearly. 
The second tranche of  ECU 190 million was paid on 2 March 1992 and will be repaid in 
one instalment after six years. 
Following. the  division  of Czechoslovakia  into  the  Czech  Republic  and  the  Slovak 
Republic on 1 January 1993, the Commission proposed that the loan be divided between 
the two Republics. 
Two thirds of the loan - ECU 250 million  - would be for the Czech Republic and one 
third - ECU 125 million - for the Slovak Republic.  · 
D.·  BORROWING  CONTRACTED  BY  THE  COMMUNITY  TO  GRANT 
BULGARIA MEDIUM-TERM FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE 
As  part  of G-24's total  aid  of ECU 580 million,  the  Commission,  on behalf of the 
Community, is empowered to borrow, in two tranches, ECU 290 million for a period of 
seven years.  The proceeds of this operation were to be on-lent on the same terms to 
Bulgaria.  · .... 
.. 
..  ' 
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The first tranche of  ECU 150 million was paid to. Bulgaria on 14 August 1991.  It will be 
repaid  in  one instalment  after seyen  years,  an~ interest,  which  is  at variable  rates,  is 
payable half-yearly.  ·  · 
. The second  tranche of  ECU 140 million was paid on 2 March 1992 and will be·  repaid in 
one instalment after six years. · Interest, which is  at variable rates; is payabJe quarterly.  . 
E.  BORROWING - CONTRACTED  BY .  THE  COMMUNITY  To- GRANT 
BULGARIA ADDITIONAL MEDIUM-TERM FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE -
· As  part of G-24's .  total  aid  of ECU 220-million,  the  Commission,  on  behalf of the 
Community, is empowered to borrow, in-two tranches,  · 
ECU 110 million for a period of seven years.  The proceeds of this operation are to be 
on.,:..lent to Bulgaria.  - · 
The first tranche will. probably be paid in thee second half of 1993 and the second in early 
1994.  .  '  . 
.  ' 
F.  BORROWING CONTRACTED BY THE COMMUNITY TO GRANT ISRAEL 
MEDIUM-TERM FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE 
As part of the financial  assi_stance  agreed for Israel and the population of the occupied 
territories,  the Commission was empowered to borrow,  on behalf of the Community, 
ECU 160 million in  one tranche for a· period of  seven years.  The proceeds were to be 
paid  out_ to Israel  on the  same tenns and  are  accompanied  by  an  interest  subsidy of 
· ECU 27.5 million paid from the Community budget. 
This- operation  started  on  2 March 1992,  The  borrowing  is  to  be  repaid  in  full  on 
15 December 1997. · 
G.  BORROWING  CONTRACTED  BY  THE  COMMUNITY  TO  GRANT . 
•  c  - ROMANIA MEDIUM-TERM FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE 
As  part  of G-24's total  aid  of ECU 750 million,  the  Commission,  on  behalf of the 
Community, is empowered to borrow, in two tranches, ECU 375 million for a period of 
seven years.  -The proceeds of this operation were to be on-lent on  the same terms to 
Romania.  · 
The  first  tranche  of  ECU 190 million  for  a  tP.rm . of  seven  years  was  paid  on 
22 January 1992.  It will  be repaid in  orie instalment on 1 February 1999,  and  interest, 
which is at variable rates, is payable half-yearly. 
•  •  r  •  ' 
The second tranche of  ECU 185 million for a term pf six years was paid on i April ·1992 · 
arid  will  be repaid in  one instalment on 18 March 1999-. . Interest,  which is  at variable 
rates, is payable half..,yearly.  ·  ·  · · 
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H.  BORROWING  CONTRACTED  BY  THE  COMMUNITY  TO  GRANT 
ROMANIA ADDITIONAL MEDIUM-TERM FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE 
As  part  of G-24's  total  aid  of ECU 160 million,  the  Commission,  on  behalf of the 
Community, is  empowered to borrow ECU 80 million  for a  maximum  period of seven 
years.  The proceeds of  this operation are to be on-lent o~  the same terms to Romania. 
In view of  its size, the loan was paid out in a single tranche on 26 February 1993.  It will 
be repaid in one instalment on 26 February 2000, and interest is payable half-yearly. 
I.  BORROWING CONTRACTED BY THE COMMUNITY TO GRANT ALGERIA 
MEDIUM-TERM FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE 
.  . 
The  Commission,  on  behalf  of  the  Community,  was  empowered  to  borrow 
ECU 400 million  for  a  maximum  period  of  seven  years  in  two . tranches  of 
ECU 250 million  and  ECU 150 million.  The  proceeds  of this  operation  were  to  be 
on-lent on the same terms to Algeria. 
A bridging loan was granted on 23 December 1991  to cover the first  tranche and was 
repaid  from  the net  proceeds of thee borrowing contracted on  14 January I 992 for  a 
period of  six years. 
The loan is to be repaid in  one instalment on 15 december 1997 and interest is payable 
annually every 15 December. 
The second tranche has not yet been paid. 
J.  BORROWING CONTRACTED BY THE COMMUNITY TO GRANT MEDJUM-
TERM FINANCIAL  ASSISTANCE  TO  THE  SOVIET UNION  AND/OR  ITS 
REPUBLICS 
The Commission has proposed a mediutri-tenn loan of up to ECU I 250 million for the 
Soviet Union and/or its Republics in  order to finance  imports of agricultural products, 
foodstuffs and medicines from the Community and Eastern Europe. 
Parliament delivered a favourable opinion and the Council adopted its formal decision on 
16 December 1991.  The guarantee · heading  was  set  up  when  the  1992  budget  was 
adopted in December 1991. 
The loan will be divided between the various Republics of  the former Soviet Union for a 
maximum period of  three years.  ·  ' 
The loan contracts were signed in the course of  1992: 
-with  Armenia  (ECU38 million),  Kyrgyzstan  (ECU 32 million),  Turkmenistan 
(ECU 45 million) and Moldova (ECU 27 million) on 10 July 1992; 
- with Ukraine (ECU 130 million) on 13 July 1992; 
-with  Belarus  (ECU 102 million),  Tajikistan  (ECU 55  million)  and  Georgia 
(ECU 70 million) on 24 July 1992; 
- with Russia (ECU 150 million) on 9 September 1992; 
-with Russia (ECU 349 million) on 9 December 1992; 
- with Kazakhstan (ECU 25 millio!l) on 15 December 1992; 
.. 
• .  . 
• 
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The amounts allocated to certain  Republics  have  since  been  revised  and  agreements· 
supplementary to the' initial contracts were signed on 5 May 1993':  ·  . 
-the amount for Armenia was increased from ECU 38 million to ECU 58 million;· 
- the amount for Georgia was increased from ECU 70 million to ECU 80 million; .  .  .  .  ~  .  ~  ' 
These increases were covered by the reallocation of ECV 30 million originally intended . 
for Kazakhstan which stated that it would not use all  this amount since ECU 25 million 
was sufficient. ·  ·  ·  · 
The total outstanding at 30.June 1993 was ECU 616 friillion.  · 
.  .  .  - -
So  far,  contracts  have  bee~  signed . for  orJy ·  ECU 1 023 inillion  since  Uzb~kistan 
(ECU 129 million) and Azeerbaijan (ECU 68:million) do not satisfy one ofthe criteria for 
eligibility - they do not accept joint and several responsibility for the debt of the former · 
Soviet Union. 
The capital repa}ment · and interest payment dates for this operation vary .  depending on 
the amount·ofthe loan and· on the Republic:  · 
- Armenia  (ECU 38. million),  Belarus,  Georgia,  Kyrgyzstan,  Moldova,  Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Russia (ECU 150 million):  · 
- interest on 20 April and 20 October  .  . 
- capital  on  20  August  1995  (20 August 1994  and  1995  for Belarus,.  Ukiaine  and 
Russia)  . 
- Armenia (ECU 20 million), Kazakhstan, Russia (ECU 349 million): 
- interest on  15 January and 15 July·  . 
. -capital on 15 January 1996 {15 January 1995 and 1996 for Russia)  ..  · 
.  ' 
K.  BORROWING  CONTRACTED  BY.  THE  COMMUNITY  TO  GRANT 
MEDIUM-TERM FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO ESTONIA.  LATVIA  AND 
LITHUNIA 
. '  '  . 
As  part  of the  G-24is  total  aid  of ECU 440 million .  for  these  thfee  cpuntries,  the 
Commission, on behalfof  the Community, is empowered to borrow ECU 220 million for 
· a period of seven years.  The proceeds of  this operation are to be on-lent on the same 
terms in two tranches:  ·  · 
- ECU 40 million for·Estonia; 
- ECU 80 million for Latvia; 
-ECU I 00 million for Lithuania  . 
. The · first  tranchys  of  the  loan  for  ·Estonia  (ECU 20 million)  and  for  .Latvia 
(ECU 40 million)  were  paid  on  Jl March 1993.  The  loans  are  to  be  paid  in  one >-
instalment on 31March 2000 and  interst is  repayable half-yearly every  31  March  and 
30 Septembec·  · 
ill~ COMMUNITY GUARANTEE TO NON.-COMMUNITY COUNTRIES. 
A.  . EUROPEAN  INVESTMENT ·  BANK  LOANS  TO  MEDITERRANEAN 
COUNTRIES GUARANTEED BY THE GENERAL BUDGET 
.  .  .  . 
Under the terms ·of the Council Decision of 8 March~  1977, the Community guarantees 
loans  to  be granted  by the European  Investment  Bank  as  part  of the  Community's 
financial commitments towards the Mediterranean countries.  · .9-
This  decision  was  the  basis  for  the  contract  of guarantee  signed  by  the  European 
Economic  Community  and  the  European  Investment  Bank  ')n  30 October 1978  in 
Brussels and 10 November 1978 in Luxembourg introducing a global guarantee of75% 
on all credit lines made available for loans in the following countries:  Portugal (Financial 
Protocol,  pre-accession_  &id),  Greece,  Spain  (financial  cooperation),  Malta,  Tunisia, 
Algeria,  Morocco,  Tt•rkey,  Cyprus,  Egypt,  Jordan,  Syna,  Israel,  Yugoslavia  and 
Lebanon.  · 
In addition, by way of  exception, a 1  000/o guarantee covers loans allocated for emergency 
aid to Portugal ii< accordance with the Council Decision of  7 October 197 5. 
A  new  extenSion  of the contract of guarantee  is  established  for  each  new  Financial·· 
Protocol. 
The  loans  authorized  at  30 June 1993  total  ECU 7 517 million,  of  which 
ECU 1 50::> million  is  for  Spain,  ilieece and  Portugal  and  ECU 6 017 million  for  the 
non-member Mediterranean countries.  At  30 June 1993  the total of outstanding loans 
came to ECU 2 161 million (taking account of  the 75% limit), of  which ECU 629 million 
was  accounted  for  by  Spain,  Greece  and  Portugal  and  ECU 1 532 million  by  the 
non-member Mediterranean countries. 
With the signature of a fourth series of protocols, the breakdown of authorizations by 
country (non-member countries only) is as follows:  . 
Old ~rotocols  4th ~rotocols  Total 
Authorizations 
Algeria  360  280  640 
Cyprus  92  92 
Egypt  492  310  802 
Israel  133  82  215 
Jordan  118  80  198 
Lebanon  . 177  45  222 
Malta  55  55 
Morocco  .297  220  517 
Syria  208  208 
Tunisia  250  168  418 
Turkey  90  90 
Yugoslavia  1  760  760 
3 032  1 185  4217 
The second protocol with Yugoslavia was suspended on 25 November 1991  but as part 
of the programme of positive measures for Bosnia-Hercegovina, the former  Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, Slovenia and  Coratia, the Em was asked to resume payments 
for projects covered by  contracts signed before 8 November 1991  (ECU 290 million is 
still to be disbursed) as far as circumstances permit.  At 31 December 1992 the Bank had 
resumed payments in Slovenia and Croatia. 
There is  also provision for. Em loans outside these protocols under Council Regulation 
(EEC) No  1763/92 of 29 June 1992  concerning  financial  cooperation in  respect· of all 
Mediterranean notr-member countries.  · 
1  The second protocol with Yugoslavia was suspended when ECU 100 million of  credits were still to 
be agreed. 
• 
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At 30 June 1993  ECU 297 million  had  been  made  available  but  no  disbursements· had 
takenplace.  ' 
The  loans  are  generally  for  15 years  with  3 to 4-year  periods  of grace  on  capital 
repayments. 
B.  LOANS  GRANTED  BY  THE  EUROPEAN  INVESTMENT  BANK  ·IN 
COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 
l!l response to a c~lmade  by the Council on 9. October 1989, the Board of  Governors of 
·the European Investment Bank decided on 29 November 1989 to authorize the Bank to 
provide  loans  from  its  own  resources  to finance  investment  projects  in  Hungary  and 
Poland  for  a  total  amount  not  exceeding  ECU ·1  billion.  These  loans  are granted  to 
finance investment projects which satisfy the Bank's usual requirements for loans from its 
own resources.  The contract of guarantee was signed on 24 April 1990 in Brussels and· 
14 May 1990 in Luxembourg.  · 
.  .  . 
On  14 ·May 1991  the budgetary  authority  extended  this ·guarantee  to  loans  made in 
CzechoslovaiQa, Bulgaria and Romania up to a maximum ofECU 700 million  .. 
' 
The extension of  the contract of  guarantee was signed on 31  July 1991. 
On  23 October 1992 the  Commission  presented  a  propos~l for  a ,Council  Decision 
extending this Community guarantee to losses. incurred by the EIB as  a result of loans 
granted  to  Estoni~, Latvia  and  Lithuania;  this  has  been  approved  by the  budgetary . 
authority.  ·  · 
The overall  ceiling  on loans  which  the  EIB  may  grant  in  these  countries  was  set · at 
ECU 200 million for a  period of  three years..  .  .. 
On 18 December 1992 the Commission also proposed ih~ extension of  this guarantee to 
losses incurred by the EIB as a result of  loans granted in Albania.  ·  · 
The  overall  ceiling  on  loans  which  the  EIB  may  grant  in.  Albania  was  set · at 
ECU 50 million for a period of  three years.  · 
The loans are generally long-term:  15 years on average with 3 to 4-year periods 'of grace 
on capital repayments.  ·  · 
At  30 June 1993,  ECU 1 090 million  had  been  made  available. in  these  six  Eastern 
European countries but only ECU 178.8 million had been disbursed. 
On 17 May 1993 the Commission presented a proposal for a Council Decision renewing 
the Community gtiarantee for a period of  three years for loans granted by the EIB iri the 
. countries ofCentraland Eastern Europe (including the Baltic States and Albania) up to a 
maximum ofECU 3 billion. 
C.  LOANS  GRANTED  BY  THE  EUROPEAN  INVESTMENT  BANK  IN 
NON-MEMBER COUNTRIES  . 
.  ' 
At its meeting of 19 May 1992 the Council (Economic and Financial Affairs) adopted the 
guidelines proposed by the Commission for thee extension of  EIB activities outside the 
Community and asked itto grant loaris in accordance with its statutes .a~nd its usual critria - II- . 
to ·projects of mutual  interest  in  countries with  which  the Community has  concluded 
cooperation agreements,  · 
An  overall  limite of ECU 250 million _per  year has  been  set for  a  3-year period;  this 
ceiling will be reviewed at the end ofthe period. 
These loans benefit from  Community budget guarantees.  The Commission presented a 
proposal  for  a  decision to this  effect on 3 June 1992.  The formam  Council  Decision 
followed on 15 February 1993. 
The budgetary authority set up a heading for this purpose in the 1993 budget. 
D.  COMMUNITY CREDIT GUARANTEE FOR EXPORTS OF AGRICULTURAL 
PRODUCTS  AND  FOODSTUFFS  FROM  THE  COMMUNITY  TO  THE 
FORMER SOVIET UNION 
The Community has decided to guarantee loans granted to the former Soviet Union by'a 
pool of  banks to finance imports of  agricultural products and foodstuffs originating in the 
Community and the countries of  Central and Eastern Europe. 
The Community guarantee covers 98%, up  to a maximum of ECU 500 million,  of any 
losses in principal (around ECU 408 million) and interest (around ECU 92 million). 
As  the credit line has not been used in  full  and  as the time limit for use has not been 
extended,  the  amount. guaranteed  comes  to  only  ECU 375 million  in  principal  and 
ECU 52 million in interest. 
The Community will receive a surety commission. of0.67% of  the amount guaranteed in 
consideration  for  this  guarantee.  Half  of  this  commission  was  paid  on 
, 26 December 1991  under  the  terms  of the  contract.  .  The  balance  was  paid  on 
28 January 1993; the reduction in the Community guaranteee was taken into account. 
On 26 November 1991  the tem1s of  the loan arid the arrangements for the utilization of 
the funds  were laid  down  in  an  exchange of letters between the Commission  and the 
Soviet authorities.  Oil the same day the Community and the banks signed a contract of 
guarantee. 
Following the disappearance of  the Soviet Union, it has been decided that the funds will 
be used by the Russian Republic. 
The loan is for three and a half years from the date of  signature.· 
Interest will  be payable half-yearly and the principal will  be repaid in  three instalments, 
20, 31  and 42 months after the agreement has been signed. 
The first repayment of  capital is due on 26 July 1993. 
The  first  interest  payment  was  due  on  9 September 1992  and·  was · made  on 
25 September 1992: 
The second interest payment was due on 9 March 1993  and was made on 2 April  1993 
together with the interest for late payment of  the S~ptember instalment. 
• 
• 
• • 
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'PART1WO:  RISK SITUATION 
There are two possible methods for evaluating the risks borne by the Coinmunity budget: 
- the method, often used by bankers, of  the .  total amount of capital outstanding for the 
operations concerned on a given date~  · 
- the  more  budgetary . approach  of  calculating  the  .  maximum  amount  which  the 
Community could have to pay out iri each financial year. 
The second appr~ach  itselfhas b¢en applied in two different ways:, 
- by reference only to actual disbursements at 3  0 June 1993, giving the minimum ·level of · 
risk to the Community assuming that there are no early repayments;  . 
-on a  more forniard-looking basis,  by  reference to all the' operations .proposed by the 
Commission in order to estimate the impact on· future budgets, giving the maximum risk 
.·borne by the CommunitY assuming that the Commission's proposals are accepted,  .  · 
For the ·latter  exercise  a number -.of  assumptions  have·  to  be  made  about  dates  of 
disbursement, terms· of  repayment, interest and exchange rates,  etc.~· details are· given in . 
the annex.  However,  this method does give some idea about the future level  of risks  · 
conneetec:! with the proposals made. 
The results are shown in the attached tables, which  as~ess the risk relating to eountries·. 
inside the Community and countries outside the Community.  .  . 
.  The. overall figures quoted cover risks of  different types;  loans to one country in the case 
of  financial assistance and loans for projects guaranteed by the borrowers in the case of 
NCI and Em operations, for example~  · ·  . 
The following  analysis  distinguishes· btWeen  total risk,  the  risk  in  rspect .of Member 
States and the risk in tespect of  non-member countries. · 
.  · L  TOTAL RISK 
A.  MOUNT OUTSTANDING AT 30JUNE 1993 (Table ll 
- : 
The total risk  at 30 June 1993  cam~ to ECU 12 834 million,  14.4% more. than at 
31 December 1992·.  . 
B.  ·  ..  MAXJMUM  ANNUAL RISK  BORNE BY THE COMMUNI'IY BVDGET: 
OPERATIONS DISBURSED AT 30 .fUNE 1993 (Table 2)  ~  . 
The  total  risk  comes  to  ECU 3 270 million  in  1993  and· will_  drop  sharply· to 
ECU 2 412 million in 1994 after Which it will-rise to ECU 2 8J.2.million in 1996.and 
. then. fall again before increasing to ECU 2 038-million in 2000.  :! - 13-
C.  MAXIMUM  THEORETICAL .  ANNUAL  RISK  BORNE  BY  THE 
COMMUNITY BUDGET <Table 3) 
This risk comes to ECU 3 394 million in 1993 and will fall  to ECU 2 990 million in 
1994  before  increasing  gradually  to  ECU 4 3  3  3 million  in  1997;  it  will  fall  to 
ECU 4 103 million  in  1998  and  increase  to  ECU 5 488 million  in  1999  and 
ECU 7 154 million in 2000. 
II.  RISK IN RESPECT OF THE MEMBER STATES 
A.  AMOUNT OUTSTANDING AT 30 JUNE 1993 (Table ll 
The amount of capital outstanding in respect of operations in the Member. States 
came to ECU 7 764 million at 30 June 1993, an increase of 10.70/o  compared with 
31  December 1992.  · 
This  increase  is  mainly  due  to  to  the  operation  in  Italy  which  accounts  for 
ECU 1 979 million.  . 
The  amount  outstanding  from  the  other  operations  has  continued  to  fall~  in 
particular, part of  the first borrowing granted to Gt-eece has been repaid. 
B.  MAXIMUM ANNUAL RISK BORNE BY THE COMMUNITY BUDGET: 
OPERATIONS DISBUR§ED AT 30 JUNE 1993 <Table 2) 
The risk for  1993  comes ·to ECU 2 744 million.  Of this total,  Greece has _already 
repaid ECU 569 million in principal in the first half of 1993 and ECU 541 million in 
NClloans. 
The risk will then drop to ECU 1 97 4 million in 1996 and will  again fall to a very 
low level  in  1999  (ECU 228 million)  before rising to ECU 1 688 million  in  2000 
when part of  the loan granted to Italy falls due (ECU 1 575 million in principal and 
interest). 
C.  MAXIMUM  THEEORETICAL  ANNUAL  RISK  BORNE  BY  THE 
COMMUNTIY BUDGET (Table 3) 
The trend is the same as in the previous case up to 1996 when the risk will amount 
to EECU 2 694 million.  It will  then drop by  ECU 500 million  in  both 1997 and 
· 1998  and  increase  to  ECU 3 547 million  in  1999  before  reaching  a  peak  of 
ECU 4 749 million in 2000, most of it accounted for by Italy (ECU 3 975 million) 
and, to a lesser extent, Greece (ECU 660 million). 
• 
• 
' 
• ·- ' 
r  / 
.. 
•  • 
' 
•• 
;  ·  .. 
'  ·~  - 14.;.. 
JR RISK IN RESPECT·OF NON-MEMBER COUNTRIES 
. - .A.  AMOUNT OUTSTANDING AT 30 JUNE 1993 <Table 1l, 
.  . 
The amount of  capital outstanding at 30 June 1993  came to ECU 5 070 million, .an 
increease of20.5% compared with 31 December 1992.  . 
Thee cotintries·ofCentral and Eastern Eur~pe accounted for 60% of  the risk .and·the 
Mediterranean countries for 40%.  ·  · 
At 31 December 1992  .. the proportion had been 55% for the countries_ of  Central and  · 
Eastern Europee arid 45% for the Mediterranean countri~s.  _  ·  . 
. B.  MAXIMUM  ANNUAL RISK ·BORNE  BY. THE <;OMMUNrrY BUDGET: 
OPERATIONS DISBURSED AT 30 JUNE 1993 (Table 2l 
'  .  .  .  .  .  .  : 
The risk for  1993 comes to·ECU 526 million and will. increase to .EClJ 1 433 million·. 
in 1995, mamtybecause two repayments of  principal then fall due:  · 
- ECU 350 million from Hungary; 
- ECU 393  milli~n froin the Rejmblic!) of  the former Soviet Union. 
' The ·risk will then drop in 1996 and mcrease again in 1997 to ECU 1 245 million as  . 
the following payments fall due:  · 
,- ECU 80 million from Hungary; 
- ECU 190 million from th~ Czech and Slovak_ Republics;~ 
- ECU 140 million fror_n Bulgaria; 
. - ECU 250 million from Algeria; 
· - ECU 160 million from Israel. 
_  At ECU 954 million, the risk will drop but still-be at a high level in 1998, but should 
· fall to less than ECU 500 million in.l999 and 2000. 
.  /  .  '  .  ' 
C. _ MAXIMuM  THEORETICAL  ANNUAL  RISK  BORNE  BY •  THE  . 
COMMUNITY BUDGET (Table 3) 
· The  ri~kfor 1995 should comet~  ECU 2  366 rD.illion; in particular, the Republics.of 
the former Soviet Union ~e  to repay principal ofECU 929 million that year .. 
The risk will drop. to ECU 1 488 million in 1996, rise again to ECU 2 13 5 million in 
1997, ECU 2 454 million in  1998 and,  after a fall to ECU 1941 million in 1999, to 
, ECU 2 405 million in 2000.  · · 
IV.  ACTIVATION OF GUARANTEES 
In the first half of 1993,the Em again Called on the budget guarantee in respect of 
loans·  of  around  EC{J 6.7 million  to  the  Republics  of  former  Yugoslavia 
. (Bosnia-Hercegovina, Macedonia arid Serbia).  This  w~s paid from the budget on 
19 May 1993.  '  .  .  . 
At 30 June the Republics of  former Yugoslavia still had to repay ECU15.2 ,million 
in reespect of  debts paid by the Community. - 15-
The Commission also made payments from  its cash resources under Article 12  of 
·Council  Regulation  No 1552/89  of  29 May 1989  implementing  Decision 
88/376/EEC, Euratom on the system of  the Communities' own resources. 
This possibility was used for the payment of  interest: 
-due from Russia on 9 March 1993  in respect of  a loan granted by a consortium 
ofbanks and guaranteed by the Community~  · 
:due from  nine  Republics  of the  former  Soviet  Union  on  20 April 1993  in 
respect of  the borrowing and lending operation of  ECU I 250 million for· these 
Republics. 
This interest was eventually paid by the debtors concerned after a delay.· 
.  . 
• 
• 
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PART THREE:  CHANGES IN POTENTIAL RISKS 
The figures given in the previo~s  ·parts provide information 'on the quantitative aspects of · 
the risks borne by the general budget.  , 
However, these data  should  be  weighted  in  accordance  with . aspects  relating  to  the 
quality  of the risk,  which  depend  on  the  type  of operation  a_nd  the _standing  of the 
borrower. 
I.  -TYPES OF OPERA  TfON 
The risks to which the above figu;es relate derivefr~m a variety of  operations which  ~an 
be divided  into two categories:  operations with  macroeconomic objectives· and  th~se 
- with microec:onomic objectives. 
A.  ·OPERATIONS .WITH.MACROECONOMIC OBJECTIVES 
The first ofthese:are the balance of  payments loans for Member States, normally carrying  · 
strict economic· conditions and undertakings.  _  ·· 
Financial  assistance operations -are_ similar  in  nature but are  intended. for  non-member 
~ountries.  -
Finally; this category includes the credit guarantee of ECU 500 million  and_ the loan of 
ECU  -1  250 million  to. finance  impoits of agricultural  products and foodstuffs  into  the 
Soviet Union, since the risk involved in these two operations depends to a large extent 
on macroeconomic and political developments in the country. 
B.  OPERATIONS WITH MICROECONOMIC OBJECTIVES 
These are loans to finance  specific projects which are usually repaid over the long tem) 
from funds which these. projects are expected to generate;  as a rule,  they are granted to . 
State companies or financial  institutions .and,  in  addition to the Community. guarantee, 
are covered by the usual guarantees demanded by banks.  · 
They are the Euratom and NCI loans in Member States and the Euratom and Effi loans-
outside the Community (Mediterranean and Central and Eastern Europe)  . 
II.  ECONOMIC  AND  FINANCIAL  SITUATION  OF  NON-MEMBER .. 
COUNTRIES  RECEIVING  ASSISTANCE  UNDER  OPERATIONS  WITH 
, MACROECONOMIC OBJECTIVES 
-All  countries receiving-assistance under operations_with macroeconomic objectives 
have been implementing stabilization and reform programmes.  The economic and 
financial  performance of these countries largely depends on the degree of progress 
with the far-reaching structural reforms that the assistance supports.  · - 17-
This  section also  provides  information  on  a  number of countries  of Central  and 
Easter Europe that are not receiving this type of  assistance - the successor States to 
Yugoslavia and the ex-Soviet Republics  . 
. A. HUNGARY 
The Hungarian  economy  has  suffered  a  severe  contraction  during  the  last  three 
years.  After a fall of  5% iri  1992, real GDP is expected to decline between 0% and 
3% this year.  Prices increased by 10.8% in the first five months of 1993, in line with 
the annual target of20-22% and just slightly below last yea~s 23%.  Unemployment 
stabilized at 677,000 (or 13.0% of the workforce) by the end  of May 1993,  after 
having dropped for three straight months. .  · 
In 1993, the government intends to generate an income ofFt 105 bn (some 3.3% of 
GDP) from privatization.  In  1992, companies to remain permanently state-owned 
have been selected and screening of the companies up for privatization has  sta~ed. 
Within this framework,  16 companies have been chosen for short-term relief. 
The financial  sector reform  is  underway.  Measures to clear-off banks' bad  debts 
were implemented in 1992 and further steps are expected in 1993.  Financial support 
is needed in agriculture, which has suffered from disorganisation and recession. 
The government intends to proceed with the public finance reform by increasing tax 
revenues  and  streamlining  expenditures,  especially  those  connected  with  social 
security.  In July  1993, ·Parliament approved a supplementary budget which brings 
the deficit this year 'to  Ft 213.3  bn,  corresponding to 6.8% of GDP.  Within  the  / 
framework  of a  3-year deficit  consolidation  programme and  as  part of its  recent 
· commitments with the IMF, the government plans to reduce the deficit  in  1994 to 
around 5.5% ofGDP.  · 
In  1992  the  current  account  showed  another  (moderate)  improvement  with  the 
surplus increasing from $ 267 mio to $ 325.  This improvement in  1992 as a whole, 
however,  hides  a  significant  and  ravid  deterioration of the current account  in  the 
second half of the year, a deterioration that has continued in  the first  half of 1993. 
The worsening of the Hungarian current account since last summer reflects both a 
sharp fall  of  exports and an acceleration of imports.  While the deterioration of the 
trade  balance  is  no  doubt  exaggerated  by  some  special  tran.sitory  factors  (the 
negative  effect  on  agricultural  exports  of the  recent  draught,  "leads  and  lags" 
behaviour  of  importers  and  exporters  on  the  expectation  of  a  more  rapid 
depreciation of  the forint,  etc.),  it basically reflects two underlying problems : first, 
while domestic demand  started a mild  recovery  in  the middle of 1992,  demand  in 
Hungary's main trading partners (and,  in  particular Germany, Austria and Italy) has 
weakened  considerably.  Secondly,  Hungary  has  suffered  a  sever~  loss  of 
international competitiveness since 1990, as reflected in the drdmatic appreciation of 
the real exchange rate of  the forint. 
In this context, a substantial  deterioration of the current account is  forecasted  for 
this year and next,  which could lead to deficits of  around $ 0.9 bn and $  1. 7 bn  in 
• 
.. 
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to be high  in  the next two years (at between $  I  bn  and  $ .1.4  bn  per year),  and the 
country has a  quite -comfortable. foreign  exchange  reserve  cushion  (sollle  $  5 .bn _in 
March 1993).  Also, with around $ 2 bn raised in the first half of 1993 through issues of 
·.international publi,c boris,.  Hungary has coilfirmed. that. it  c~ntimies to. enjoy rather easy 
access to the international· capital markets.  In this respect, both Moody's and Standard 
and Poor's have maintained Hungary's long-t-::rm foreign currency bond ratings at Ba  1 
·and BB+, respectively.  Finiilly, Hungary has agreed in_principle with the IMF on a IS-
month stand-by credit out of  which the first drawing is expected in fall. 
.  .  . 
The country's gross external debt in convertible currencies amounted to $ 21.4 bn at the 
end of1992 (65% of GDP), down froin  $ 22.3  bn at the end of 1991.  However, the 
structure of the debt,  which  had improved  significantly  in  recent years,  deteriorated. 
sorrie~hat in  1992, as the proportion of  short-term loans increased from 9.6 to 10.7%. 
Total debt service amounted to$ 4.4 bn in  1992; an increase from$ 4 bn  in  1991, but" 
was little  changed  as  a  percentage of exports of goods  and  services  (about  34%). 
Principal repayments ($ 2.8 bn in  1992) are projected. to decline to around $ 2.2 bn  in 
1993 and 1994 but will rise sharply to $ 3 bn and 3. 5 bn in  1995 anci 19%, respective.ly. 
In view of the  present  deterioration of the current ac:count,  this  could  increase  the 
pressure on Hungary's balance of  payments in·the corning years. 
B. CZECH AND SLOVAK REPUBLICS 
Real GDP in  the whole of  the former Czech and  Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR) fell 
again by an estimated 7% in  1992, after having decreased by 15% in the previous year. 
. However, over the year the decline in output was partially halted and at the end of 1992 · 
some sectors began to show sings of recovery.  The auth0rities ofthe CSFR continued 
to implement  tight  monetary and  fiscal  p~licies,  and  inflation,  having  increased  by 
58.7%in 1991-in the wake of  the liberalizatio-n of prices, slowed down.to 12% in  1992. 
The introduction of a  VAT  i"n  Jarmary  of 1993  has."·  however,  pushed  year-on-year 
· inflation in the new independent republics again above 20%. · 
The split of  the federation has so far had quite unfavourable economic repercussions for 
the successor republics,  particularly for Slovakia which has lost a !atge fiscal  transfer 
. from the Czech Republic and is confronted with the need to finance an important trade 
deficit  vis-a-vis the latter.  Both countries agreed on the creation of a customs  and 
monetary  union  after  the  dissolution  of the  CSFR.  But  uncertainty  about  the 
consequences of  the break-up of  the federation and speculation about the future of the 
monetary union (which was seen  as  a. transitory arrangement),  gave rise  to a strong 
capital  flight,  produced  large _losses  of reserves  in  both republics  and  provoked  the 
collapse of the monetary  union  only_  one  month  aft"er  it  was  set  up.  Although  the 
custom union remains in  force" and a  clearing  system  has been agreed between both 
republics, inter-republican trade has dropped sharply since the currency split.  Initially, 
Slovakia tried to keep its currency at parity with the Czech crown but it finally accepted 
the IMF recommendations and devalued by 10% its ·currency against the Czech unit last 
July. - 19-
after it  was  set  up.  Although  the custom union  remains  in  force  and a  clearing 
system has been agreed between both republics, inter-republican trade has dropped 
sharply since the currency split.  Initially, Slovakia tried to keep its currency at parity 
With the Czech crown but it finally accepted the IMF recommendations and devalued 
by I 00/o its currency against the Czech unit last July.  · 
The  Czech  and  Slovak  republics  face  quite  different  economic  situations · and 
prospects.  While  Czech real  GDP  may grow by 0-3% in  1993,  Slovak output is 
expected to decline this year by another 3-6%.  Also, unemployment is much higher 
in Slovakia (12% of  the labour force) than in the Czech Republic (less than 3%) and· 
Slovakia has a weaker industrial  structure and a greater share of the defence  and 
heavy industries where CMEA markets have collapsed.  IIi addition, while after the 
VAT-induced price "jump" oflast January prices have been quite stable in·the Czech 
Republic and  may show at the end of 1993  a year-on-year increase of around  16% 
(9-10% excluding the VAT effect), the recent devaluation. ofthe Slovak crown may 
put Slovak inflation at 25-30% by the end of  the year. 
Although the dissolution of the CSFR has since last summer tended to dominate the 
political debate and has diverted some attention from structural reforms, progress in 
some areas has continued to be made.  Thus, the bidding rounds of  the first wave of 
large-scale "voucher privatisation",  involving  1,500 companies,  were completed in 
December 1992.  The Czech Republic  has  already announced  plans for  a  second 
wave of large-scale voucher-based privatisation,  which  is  expected to begin  in  the 
second half of 1993  and should affect over 2,000 ·additional firms.  Meanwhile, the 
Slovak republic· is  planning to privatise around 500 enterprises in  the second wave 
although instead of voucher-based methods the Slovak government intends to rely 
more on traditional privatisation methods,  such as direct sales to foreign  investors, 
"management  bug-outs"  and  tenders.  Other recent  noteworthy  structural  reform 
measures are the new,  quite tough, Czech bankruptcy law that came into effect last 
April,  the opening last June of the Prague Stock Exchange arid  the comprehensive 
tax reform implemented by both republics in January 1993. 
The convertible trade balance of the  CSFR suffered  an  important deterioration  in 
1992,  with  the  deficit  increasing  from  $  0.4  bn  to  $1.6  bn.  The  deterioration 
occurred entirely in the second half of  the year and, particularly, iri the last months of 
the year as consumers anticipated imports ahead of  the introduction of  the VAT and 
companies  accelerated  import  payments  fearing  a  devaluation. or a  restriction  of 
currency  convertibility  after  the  split  of the  federation.  Therefore,  part  of the 
worsening of the trade balance reflected transitory factors, but was also due to the 
recovery of  domestic demand as the economy started to, slowly and unevenly, move 
out of recession.  Strengthened  net  invisible ·receipts,  however,  offset  to  a  large 
extent the trade deterioration,  with  the result that the convertible current  account 
surplus of  the CSFR fell  only moderately (from$ 0.4 bn to$ 0.2 bn).  Furthermore, 
the net inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) increased dramatically (from $ 0.6 
bn in  1991  to$ I.  Ibn) despite a very weak fourth quarter due to  th~.uncertainties 
caused by the upcoming division of  the country. ()". 
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·Balance of payments prospects for  1993  and  1994  differ ,substantially between the 
Czech and th~ Slovak republics.  The Czech Republi~ is likely to see its trade· surplus 
turn into. a growing deficit as domestic demand  continues to recover and  Slovakia · 
struggles to reduce its bilateral· trade deficit.  However, the Czech Republic should 
have  no  problems  in  the next  two years  to  finance  the  resulting  current account 
deficit:  The deterioration of the current account  will  actualiy  occur from  a very 
comfortable initial  position  and .  should not  be .  dramatic  since the Czech  Republic 
continues  to enjoy  a  competitive  real  exchange  rate.  Furthermore, ·the  Czech 
Republic, which in the last 2 years has  received about 90% of the total amount of 
FDI flowing into the fomier CSFR, should' rontinue to attract in the coming years a 
- net inflow of Fnl of between $0.8 bn  and  $  1 hn  per iumum.  Finally,  the Czech 
Repub.lic  has  already recovered  much  of the foreign  exchange reserves lost in  the 
months that preceded the collapse ofthe monetary union with Slovakia; it has signed 
last March a 12-month $ 250 miostand-by credit with the IMF;  and  enjoys good 
· . access to the international capital  markets.  The Czech government has,  in  effect, 
inherited (and reinforced) the CSFR federal government's solid reputation for sound .. 
and ort_hodox macroeconomic policies and is perceived by the markets to be strongly 
committed to market-oriented reforms.  This.has been reflected in  the upgrading to 
·an "investment grade" of Moody's rating (from the Ba  I · p::-eviously  assigned to the 
CSFR to Aa3).  . .  .  . 
The, balance  of payments  situation  and  prospects  in  Slovakia  are  more  difficult. 
Slovakia has lost the large fiscal  transfer from  the Czech side,  a transfer that_ more 
than financed  its  trade deficit  vis-a-vis ·tl:te  Czech Republic  in  1992.  Its· current 
ac_count  will' probably improve this year. and next owing to the continuing recession 
which depresses imports and the expected effects of  recent devaluation of  the Slovak 
.  crown and· the import surcharge on consumer gooas to be shortly introduced:  But 
Slovakia has a :vulnerable foreign exchange reserves position an·d the risk of  balance 
of  payments difficulties provoked by capital flight.has not entirely disappeared, even 
· after the 10% devaluation of the Slovak crown..  Furthermore, and in contrast with  . 
-the  Czech  Republic,  the.· Slovak  authorities  cari·  no  longer  benefit  from  the · 
international reputation that the federal  governn1ent had built up over the last three 
years.  Accordingly, its sovereign rating and its degree of  access to the international 
_.capital· markets-are much lower than those ·of the Czech RepubliC (Moody's has not 
yet  reassigned a rating to Slovakia as  at)  independent country but,  when  and  if it 
does, it will probably \Je slightly below the Ba1  rating the CSFR used to have). 
·'  The devaluation and the $ 90  mio  loan agreed  in  principle last June with the IMF 
under the newly  created  "Systemic Transformation  Facility"  should  help  eas~ the · 
·balan~e of  payments situation and will C()ntnbute to resto.~e confid~nce in the Slovak 
economy.  The devaluation, in particular, will allow to.reduce the-trade deficit vis-a-
.  vis the Czech Republic withput having to rely only on import compression.  But if  a 
re~emergence of balance  of ·  paym~nts  pre~sure .  is . to  be · avoided,  th~ ·Slovak 
government must apply the right macro-economic stabilization policies (in particular 
a restrictive fiscal policy) and press ahead with structureil reform, 
I 
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Regarding  foreign  debt,  the  former  CSFR  had  a  low · foreign · debt  burden. 
Convertible  currency  external  debt  amounted  to  only  $  9.4  bn  in  1991  and.  fell 
further to  $9.2 bn (or 26% ofGDP) at the end of 1992.  At the 2:1  ratio at which 
the Czech and  Slovak  au~horities have  agreed  to split  most of the  former  CSFR 
outstanding liabilities, the convertible debt of  the Czech Republic totalled$ 6.2 bn at 
. the start of 1993  (24% of Czech GDP) and .that of the Slovak Republic  $3.1  bn 
(30% of Slovak GDP).  Total debt service (interest and  repayments)  in  the CSFR 
amounted last year to$ 1.9 bn (12.2% of  exports of  goods and services).  Ifthe total 
debt service is allocated between the successor republics at the 2: I  ratio, this results 
in total debt services of $1.3  bn  and $ 0.7 bn in the Czech Republic and .Slovakia, 
respectively, or 11.6% and  12.6% ofthe estimated values oftheir respective exports 
of goods  and  services.  Principal  repayments  associated  with . the  total  foreign 
obligations of  the former CSFR are expected to rise gradually from  1992 ($  1.3  bn) 
to 1994 ($1.5 bn),  increase quite sharply in  1995  (to $  1.2 bn) and,  then,  fall  even 
more sharply in  1996 (to $1.2 bn) and  1997 (to $870 bn).  While the sharp increase 
in  debt  repayments  of 1995  should  create  no  particular  problems  for  the  Czech 
· Republic,  it  could  add  some pressure to the  more  fragile  balance of payments  of 
Slovakia. 
C. BULGARIA 
Bulgaria's economic performance has been worse than that of most other countries 
of the region.  In  1991  real  GDP  fell  by  170/o,  real  wages fell  by  about half,  and 
inflation was close to 300%.  The decline continued in  1992, with GDP falling by a 
further 8% in real terms; industrial output is down about 20% over 1991, with only 
tentative signs of  recovery; inflation remains high at 4-6% per month (80% overall in 
1992), and unemployment is over 15% of the labour force.  External factors  have 
exacerbated the crisis  : the debt problem  (Bulgaria has been cut off from  foreign 
credits since 1990 when it declared a unilateral  moratorium on debt-servicing); the 
collapse  of the  ex-USSR,  on  which  Bulgaria  was  more  dependent  than  other 
countries;  large  uncollectable  claims  on  Libya  and  Iraq;  and  most  recently,  the 
embargo against Serbia, which was a major export market. . 
Economic  reform  has  so  far  mainly  consisted  of liberalization  and  stabilisation 
measures.  In  particular, cautious macroeconomic policies and an early introduction  -, 
of internal convertibility allowed most domestic prices to adjust to market-clearing 
levels  without  triggering  an  inflationary  spiral.  Structural  refnrm  has  proceeded 
more  slowly,  in  part  because  of inadequate  political  coQsensu5  during .1991  anci 
1992.  However,  considerable  legislative  progress  on  privatization  and  other 
structural measures has been made and  small-scale privatization and  restitution are 
advancing well.  On  the other hand,  there have been considerable delays  in  large-
scale  privatization. ·  For  medium-term  prospects,  much  will  depend · on  how 
vigorously the legislation is implemented.  A resum~tion of  growth will  need to be 
export-led - there is no room for monetary or fiscal  stimuli.  This requires that the 
debt crisis be resolved, and that export markets, especially in Europe, be sufficiently 
open. -22-
After the end of the political crisis, Bulgaria resumed its relations with the IMF in 
the framework  of the  stand-by  arrangement  with  the .Fund  that -expired  in · April 
1993.  The government is at present negotiating a  new programme, to be supported  · 
by a new SBA 
The  improvement  of the  external  financial  situation  of the.  country  continued  in _ 
1992.  The trade balance was slightly positive, following a bigger increase of  exports 
than  that of· imports  (imports  are  still  low,  mainly  due  to  shortfalls  in  external 
fin~ncing).  International  r~serves are·close to $  1 billion  or three months'  imports 
(they. were  over  US$  1.1  billion  in  the  e~d of October  1992).  They  remain, 
however,  weak  in  view  of the  likely  needs  that  may  arise  in  the context  of the 
. ·settlement of Bulgaria's  commercial  debt.  The ·negotiations_ with  the  commercial 
banks ·an this issue have recently· progressed and there are some reasons to believe · 
that ·a generous debt .  reduction agreement may he  reached by· the end  of 1993  (in 
November 1992, the two parties had  reached  an  agreement on the main  principles 
for a future debt and debt service reduction package).  In December 1992, Bulgaria 
secured  a  further .  debt· relief from  its  official  creditors.  .  The  new  Paris  Club· -
agreement reschedules the debt  servicing  due up  to  April  1993 together with the 
ar:rears incurred since the expiry of  the consolidation period covered by the previous · 
agreement (concluded in April. 1991).  As soon· as a new stand-by arrangement with ·· 
the IMF is concluded, a.new round ofdiscussions with the official creditors will take 
place with a view to reaching a further debt rescheduling agreement.  Overall,  the · 
external  debt  is  estimated· to US$  12  billion  (some .126%  of GDP  and· 280% of 
_exports) including some $ 9.3  billion owed to commercial creditors.· About half of 
this debt is made up of  arrears on short-term deposits and letters of  credit.  The debt 
has been increasing in  1992 since Bulgaria is still accumulating arrears. (the interest 
payments that were resumed in September 1992 - but suspended  temp~rarily  in June 
. this year- amounted to only 20% of current interest falling due).  The debt-service 
ratio is estimated at some 50% of convertible currency export earnings, and  would 
reach 150% if  principal and interest arrears are taken into  c~nsideration.  The price 
of  this debt on the secondary market has fluctuated around 20%. 
D. ROMANIA 
Romarua  has  embarked  smce  1991  ·on  comprehensive  programmes  aimed  at 
.resthicturing  the  economy  and  eliminating  major  economic  imbalances.  Despite 
initial  progress in  liberalizing  th~ economy,· stabili~ation has  yet- to be achieved .. 
Output declined substantially by 13 and 15% respec!ively. in 1991  and 1992; inflation 
has remained high (at some 200% per year); and official foreign exchange reserves 
were depleted by the end of 1992..  . 
The Romanian· authorities strived to maintain  prudent fiscal. and  monetary policies 
during most of  the period,. and exercised wage restraint.  However, owing to policy 
shortcomings in  the> implementation of the reform programme (price 'liberalization, 
·restr:ucturing of enterprises and exchange rate policy), monetary and. fiscal  restraint 
· failed to contain inflation and stabilize the exchange. rate.  On the fiscal_ side, despite 
a dramatic decline iri government revenues and an initial increase in  curr~nt transfers -23-
(in  connection  to  price  liberalization),  the  budget  deficit  narrowly  defined  was 
contained to 2% of GDP  in  1991,  owing  in  part to·a compression of investment 
expe~diture.  In 1992, the budget deficit increased to 5% of GDP,  due to growing 
consumer subsidies.  However, the budget deficit does not accurately reflect the true 
fiscal stance, as extra-budgetary expenditure remained substantial. 
In  the  context  of a  shortage  of foreign  exchange,  the  authorities  have  pursued 
conflicting exchange rate policies.  In principle, the exchange rate is determined by 
market forces since June 1992.  However, the authorities have attempted to slow the 
devaluation process in  ~~ep-wise adjustments·in the hope of  containing inflation.  The 
exchange rate has been  pegged at an  unsustainable level  in  view of the prevailing 
inflation· over long  periods of time.  This  has  resulted  in  large  discounts  on  the 
parallel market, the rationing of  imports and,  following the elimination of surrender 
requirement  for  exporters  in  June  1992,  in  the  build  up  of deposits  in  foreign 
currencies by  exporters whereas  official  reserves  were depleted.  This  policy has 
failed to contain inflation~ but it has generated speculation against the leu.  Thus, the 
leu remained pegged to the dollar at the increasingly overvalued rate of leu 430 per 
dollar during the last three months of 1992.  Since then, the authorities have let the 
rate slip and at mid-June 1993, it was standing at leu 694 per dollar. 
One of  the purposes of  the exchange rate policy pursued has been to contain imports 
through rationing without hindering exports (the proceeds of  which could be kept in 
foreign  exchange).  However,  large  public  sector  imports  of grain  (Romania 
experienced a severe draught in  1992) and  energy products effected  by end-1992 
resulted  in  a  larg~ deterioration of the current account deficit for  1992 to some 8 
112% ofGDP (5% in  1991).  Substantial capital inflows, reflecting the disbursement 
of foreign  assistance,  more  than compensated  current  account deficit.  However, 
whereas the external. position of commercial  banks improved substantially,  official 
foreign  reserves were depleted by  end-1992.  External debt increased substantially 
from 4% ofGDP at the end of 1991  to over 13% by the end of 1992.  Debt service 
·ratio, however, remained below 10% of  exports ofgoods and services. 
The  Romanian  authorities  designed  a  reform  strategy  to transform  the economy 
rapidly  into a  market-based  system.  To this  end,  the government developed  and 
implemented ·a legal  and  institutional  framework  to  establish  the  central  role  of 
private ·ownership  and  decision-making.  The  reform  progra~e has  achieved 
significant  progress.  Most  consumer  prices  have  bee·n  liberalized.  . Quantitative 
restrictions  on  imports  have  been  removed,  and  tariffs  used  to  protect  domestic 
industries have been reduced to low levels.  Wage determination has been freed, with 
. the institution of collective bargaining.  The financial  system has been deregulated. 
Citizens have been given the right to establish· businesses, to compete freely in the 
market, and to acquire, retain and dispose of property.  Finally, the Government has 
proceeded to tran~fer state assets to the-population. 
The reforms have also met with some setbacks.  The exchange rate system has not 
been  functioning  as  envisaged.  Price liberalization  has  not been  completed,  with 
administrative  intervention  in  price  setting  persisting · for  some  goods  at  the · 
' ' / 
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wholesale levels.  Enterpris~ restructuring has  not beenas rapid  as-hoped and  the 
government has not been able to impose strict  financial discipline on enterprises.  ' 
The· late.  Stand-By  Arrangement  with  the  IMF  expired  in  March  1993.  The 
Romanian .authorities are currently  n~gotiating a new programme, to be supported 
by a new Arrangement.  .  .  · 
.  . .  . 
E. THE. BALTIC STATES 
The economies of the Baltic states were highly integrated within the Soviet Union 
economic system, from which they regained -their independence in  August 1991.  All 
three countries  ha~e $uffered a severe downturn· in  economic activity a:s  trade with 
· . former  Soviet_  republics,· particularly  Russia, ·has  declined.  · The  sit~ation  was 
exacerbated in  1992 by a  terms or'trade' shock caused. by Russia's move to market 
prices for exports.  It now appears that the severe output declines have been halted. 
Estonia 
'· 
In the first  half of 1993,  output seems to have stabilized,  following  declines  iri  the 
· order of 27% in  1992  and  11.8% in  1991  ~  ·Unemployment is  increasing;  in  May· 
1993,  registered-unemployment stood at 21,133  (about 3.2% of ttie Iabour force), 
about double the level reached at the_ end ofJast year.  But hidden unemployment is 
l:>elieved to be much higher.  The budget for 1992 showed a surplus of 13% of  GOP. 
in 1992; the surplus even reached  5% in  the first  quarter of l993, supported by  a 
decline  of tax  arrears  and  .continued  reluctance of state  enterprises  to  lay  off ' 
employees.  Inflation came down substantially at the end of last year and continued 
to decline in July; in the last cquple ofmonths, the monthly increase in the consumer 
price index stabilized at 2-3%.  ·  ·  · 
_ Price liberalization has largely been completed, and the emergence of  a rational price 
structure has been assisted by the introduction of  Estonia's own convertible currency 
the kroon .. Privatization  was at first  limited  to  small-scale enterprises,  with  o.yer 
40% sold into  private ownership by  the end of  1992.  The government has  made 
·progress in· 1993 towards accelerating-the process of  privatization.·  In response to a· 
liquidity crisis in the banking system in late .1992, the Estonian authorities d~cided to 
liquidate one major bank and to recapitalize and merge two others.- Recapitalization 
was  affected  by 'means  of a bond  issue  and  limited  support  from  central' bank 
.reserves.· One. further bank has since b~en liquidated. 
Negotiations on the sale of25 out of 38  large  enterpri~es_ offered for international 
tender last year are being finalized and the bids for another 52 large enterprises were 
received in Summer 1993.  The government is also preparing legislation for creating · 
a holding company that consolidates the ownership and sales 6f all  state enterprises ' 
under a single agency.  It is expected that the restitution process Will accelerate now 
. that the governrrient has approved a fir:tal deadline of  1 April  1993 for filing claims. -25-
In  1992,  Estonia's  current account,  which  had  shown  a  substantial  surplus  in  the 
previous year,  deteriorated  signifi~ntly as  Russia  started to charge world  market 
prices for its exports to Estonia at the beginning of  the year.  However, contrary to 
earlier estimates, the current account recorded a small surplus, with exports and the 
services balance higher than expected and imports below programmed levels.  There 
was as  a· result an unexpectedly high build-up of international reserves.  The trade 
balance  showed  a  small  deficit  in  1992,  which  seems  to  be  increasing  in  1993. 
Whereas trade with the FSU remained  at low levels,  it expanded  rapidly with  the 
We.,t and now constitutes 70% of  total trade. 
In September 1992, IMF Board approved a one-year stand-by loan totalling about 
$39  mio  for  the  period  1  July  1992  - 30  june  1993  backing  the  Estonian 
government's  reform  and  stabilization  programme.  Estonia  purchased  the  first 
tranche (about $ 11  mio) in September 1992 and the second tranche in January, but 
it decided not to purchase the third and fourth tranches because of  the unexpectedly 
comfortable reserve  position.  The IMF  expects that all  outstanding tranches will 
have been requested by September.  At  the end of March  1993,  Estonia's foreign 
debt amounted to$ 47 mio (about 4.5%'ofGDP). 
As a consequence of  the substantial terms of trade loss and the general breakdown 
of  traditional trading patterns, real GOP fell by about 30% in  1992, following an 8% 
decline  in  1991.  In May  1993,  the  unemployment  rate  stood  at  5.2%  of the 
workforce,  more  than  double  the  rate  at  the  end  of 1992.  Moreover,  hidden 
unemployment is widespread and the government expects unemployment to increase 
to  12% by the end of 1993.  The 1992 budget showed a deficit of about  1.4% of 
GOP,. resulting from difficulties in the enterprise and the accumulation o.ftax arrears. 
The budget for  1993  envisages balance for current expenditures, but revenues have 
not matched expectations so far. this year,  leading the government to seek a further 
loan from the central bank.  Inflation has come down substantially since the Latvian 
monetary reform in July 1992.  For the first time since the price liberalization started, 
the retail price index fell in May.  . 
Price liberalization has progressed well in Latvia; only a few items remain subject to 
control.  Privatization, however, has so far been confined mainly to azricultural co-
operatives, small shops and service establishments.  By the end of 1992 about 60% 
of  eligible enterprises in this group had been privatized either through sales or leases. 
For large-scale enterprises, 433  privatization projects (out of a total of 844 eligible 
enterprises) were received by branch ministries by end-December 1992 and are now 
being evaluated.  The government is currently organizing a voucher system approved 
by parliament in November.  A law adopted last August identifies an initial 25 large-
scale enterpris~s suitable for early privatization. 
Latvia's  current  account  situation  worsened  significantly  in  1992  owing  to  the 
substantial terms of  trade shock which affected the economy at the beginning of  the 
year  when  Russia  started  to  charge  market  prices  for  its  exports  to  Latvia. 
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Nevertheless, the deficit in  the trade balance,  which was incurred entirely with the 
. FSU, was more than compensated by a  surplus in the services balance-resulting in· a  .· 
current  account surplus  and  an  increase  by  $  52  mio  of gross  national. reserves. 
However, as external  financing has increased substantially in the first  half ·of 1993 
and 'economic' activity is stabilizing,. the current account seems now to have  ~oved 
into deficit.  ·  i..atvia•s official external debt outstanding stood at $58 mio (about 5% 
of GDP) on 31  December 1992 and is likely to have increased considerably in  the 
first half of 1993.  Latvia never recognized the 1.14% share of the .FSU debt it was 
assigned during the negotiations ofthe FSU.  Negotiations on this issue with Russia 
are still under way. 
··Lithuania 
Real  GDP fell  by  about JS% in  1992,  following  a decline of about  13% in  1991. 
Registered unemplo:Yment  more than. doubled since the end of 1992 and  stood at 
· 29,000 in May 1993 (in the order  of 1.5%).  Contrary t<' the other two Baltic States; 
inflation  remained  high  into  I ?93,  but seems to_ finally  be coming  doWn  (monthly 
rates of25% in April,  13% in May, 6% in June) as monetary control is strengthened. 
The budget was in surplus (2% of  GDP) -iri  1992· and for 1993 only a small deficit is  . 
expected.  -
Pnce liberalization has progressed to the extent that all  goods and· services except 
·household energy products and monopoly products are de-controlled..  Privatization 
has progressed relatively fast  in  Lithuania.  Vouchers have been given tp citizens, · 
which can be used together with cash as payment for various acquisitions including 
. for  residential  property,  small  firms  and  larger  enterprises.  ,-The  government  is 
concerned  that  privatization  has  proceeded  without  sufficient_  attention  to 
restructuring, thus hindering  rationalization  and  labour .shedding.  It is,  therefore, 
reviewing. the  privatization  programme.  Agrarian  reform· is  also  under  review. 
Privatization of large collectives  ha~ resulted  in  production units  which .  seem. too 
small to be efficient. 
I::  1992, Lithuania•s current account situation· deterionited. ~onsiderably  ..  Negative 
factors  were the severe drought and  the terms of trade shock induced  by Russia 
whose export prices for Lithuania reached world market level_s·in Fall  ! 992.  For the . 
year as a whole, the current account was in surplus as was the trade balance.  Gross 
national reserves increased by $75  mio  in  1992,  excluding the return of gold from 
the·Bank ofEngland; France and Switzerland (totalling about $ 63  mio).  At t:,e end 
. of 1992, the stock ofLithuania•s external debt represented &e~me 8% of  GDP b;;t it i:; 
.  now  likely  to· increase  as  assistance  from  EC/G-~~ is  flowing  in:  During tne 
interstd.te negotiations on the FSU debt, Lithuania was assigned 1.41% of  the overall 
debt (about $  1 bn),  which  it never recognized.  Negotiations are  still  under way . 
. with Russia on this issue. ·  . -27-
F. ALGERIA 
Algeria's external debt stands at US$ 25 billion, with a s~rong short-term component. 
Against  the  background  of a  heavy  external  debt  service,  equivalent  to 70%  of 
export  revenues,  the  authorities  introduced  further  import  and  foreign  exchange 
restrictions  in  September  1992,  combined  with  a  series  of domestic ·  austerity 
measures.  These  have  triggered  a recession  in  output and  rising  unemployment. 
Real GDP rose by about 3% in  1992 but is expected to fall  in  1993.  Social tensions 
have been relieved by the agreement of a "pact" between the government and  the 
unions,  trading  a  wage  freeze  for  security  of employment  and  price  increase  ·  ~ 
restrictions. 
Price  liberalization  measures  and  continued  depreciation  of the  Dinar,  fueled 
inflation· in  1991  and  early  1992.  In  the  second  half of 1992,  the government 
stopped the gradual  depreciation of the nominal exchange rate which,  against  the 
background of continuing  strong inflation  (over 30% in  1992), .resulted  in  a  real 
exchange rate appreciation (22% in 1992) and further loss of  competitiveness of  the · 
Algerian economy.  Since government revenue is  heavily _dependent upon taxes on 
oil  exports,  the  real  appreciation  of the  Dinar  had  a  negative  impact  on  fiscal 
revenues.  Negative real interest rates have increased, demand for credit, especially 
from public enterprises with access to financial institutions. 
Since 1992, a growing budget deficit  has become a major contributor to inflation. 
The overall fiscal balance deteriorated from a surplus of  4.3% of  GDP in 1991  to a 
deficit of 1% in 1992, which is expected to further increase to nearly 10% of  GDP in 
the first half of  1993. 
Algeria is seeking bilateral financing agreements to meet growing external financing 
needs.  This  effort,  however,· might  be complicated  by  the fact  that the stand-by 
arrangement with the  IMF  went  off-track  in  early  1992.  Negotiations for  a new 
programme have  not  so  far  been  conclusive,  as  the new government's  economic 
policy  excludes  any  further  nominal  depreciation  of the  Dinar,  advocates  strict 
regulatipn of  imports and foreign currency al!ocations, and leads to a slow-down in 
the economic reform and liberalization process in general. 
G. ISRAEL 
In  1992,  Israel's  macro-economic  situation  continued  to  improve.  The  country 
recorded a third year of  strong growth, with real GOP increasing by 6.4% (5.8% in 
1991).  Growth  was  fuelled  by  an  8.5%  increase  in  industrial  production  and  a 
strong  upsWing· in  tourism  (  +  3  9%  ),  reflecting  restored  confidence  after  the.  Gulf 
War.  ' 
Although  employment  continued  to grow,  regular  waves of immigratio·n  keep  an 
upward  pressure  on  the  unemployment  rate,  which  increased  for  the  sixth 
consecutive year to 11% of the labour force .. A change in  social legislation which· 
allows immigrants to benefit from  income support schemes after a  12-month stay 
(instead of24-months) caused a 158% increase in the number ofbeneficiaries  ..  .  . \ 
'--
- . ---..... 
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In l992, consumer price inflation fe11,  for the. first time since 1969, to .a single digit 
level  of 9. 8%;  down from. a  ptak level  of 50% in  ·1 990 and  18%  in '1991. . This 
allowed the Central Bank to relax monetary policy and interest rates declined from 
28% at the end of 1991  to 19% at .the end of 1992.  The_ government budget deficit 
stood at 6.2% in 1992 and is expected to fall  to 5.7% in  1993. 
- . 
The  downward  trend  in  interest rates was  temporarily  reversed in  Jariuary 1993 
-. because ofa _large '~emand for foreign currency, ·fuelled by expectations of  a further 
dev:aluatiori of the Shekel.  In  1992, the Shekel depreciated by  approximately  10% 
- . vis-a-vis a  basket of  currencies of  major trading partners.  For 19~B, a further 9.5% 
nominal devaluation is forecasted. - _  -
The current account has turned from a$ 1.2 bn.surplus in 1989 to an estimated$ 1.5_ 
bn deficit in  1992.  This is mainly due to a  considerably. worsening trade balaryce with 
:fast  rising  imports  arid  insufficient  export  growth.  The  trade  balance  deficit 
increased from  $  4. 7 in  1991  to over 5 bri  inn  I 992.  Towards the end  of 1992, 
growth switched from  the domestic market oriented construction sector (driven by 
housing n~eds of  new immigrants) to the more export oriented manufacturing sector. 
·.  This is likely to improve the trade balance in  1993. ·•  · 
-- To finance the investment effort necessary to absorb. the recent ~ave  of  immigration, 
Israel  received  a  _$  250  million_ Compensatory and  Contingency Facility fro·m  the 
IMF in  1992.  The USA authorised a $ 10 billion loan guarantee which removed the  ---
constraint of  foreign exchange shortage and  <;>pened  up the way for further foreign. 
borrowing tp finance investments and the overall external deficit.  The need for such 
-_-foreign hoJ?'owing highlights the problem of an insufficient export orientation of  the 
economy. 
Gross external debt stood at $ 3.8  billion .(61%  of GDP) end .199L  Debt s_ervice 
-· represented 27% of exports,  down  from  80%  in  1985.  This remains a  relatively.· 
sound bas-is to attract further foreign borrowing to fina~ce investment.- - ·  ·. 
H~  FORMER SOVIET UNION  · . 
The economi~ crisis in the former  Sovi~t  l.]nion has gro~n increasingly acute during 
1992  and  early  1993.  Central  planning  h(!s  collapsed  in  most  of the  newly 
independent states and trade between them  has  declined  by an  estimated 20-30%. 
Throughout most of the area, monetary conditions are chaotic, credit policy is  lax 
and  the financial  system barely functions.  Budgets are out of control,  especially  -
because  of tax  co11ection  problems.  Hatd  .. currency  exports  have  plummeted, 
resulting in external payments crises.  As  a result,  o'utptlt  is  declining rapidly (real 
-GDP is  likely to have fallen  by roughly 20% in  1992); and  inflation is  very high. 
Industrial  restructuring  and · labour  shedding  have  not  really  started  ·and 
unemployment is still low.  ·  · 
Far-reaching economic reform has begun in  many republics,  but progress has been-
uneven.  At  th~ beginning  of 1992  Russia · set  the tone  by  launching  a  bold,  if 
insufficiently .comprehensive,  reform  programme.  ,.  From  the spring onwards,· the -29-
pace of reform began to falter as domestic opposition mounted, in  particular from 
the parliament and the powerful state enterprise sector.  As a result, macroeconomic 
stabilization  failed  and inflation  has  remained  very  high.  Legal,  institutional ·and 
structural reform has advanced only slowly, although some progress was made with 
privatization.  In Ukraine, economic policy has been determined mainly by nationalist 
forces  intent  on  asserting  independence  from  Moscow,  who  have  neglected  to 
introduce the legal  and  institutional  framework  necessary for  a  market  economy. 
The goal of  a separate Ukrainian currency and reticence towards the CIS should also 
be seen in this context.  The government which came to power in  Octob~r appears 
to be more  strongly  committed  to reform  but economic  policy-making  has  been . 
paralyzed  by  sharp  political  divisions  on  the  course  of reform.  Several  other 
republics have made considerable strides in the transition to market-based systems : 
Kyrgyzstan  is  probably the most advanced  : it  has  recently concluded  a  stand-by 
arrangement  with  the  IMF;  Kazakhstan,  Belarus  and  Moldova  are  close  to..-r .-
concluding  transitional  arrangements  with  the  Fund  under  the  newly  created 
Systemic  Transformation  Facility  (Russia  has  already  concluded  such  an 
arrangement).  In other states, however, fewer efforts at reform have been made and 
either civil war or ethnic conflicts are disrupting the economy more than any attempt 
at transition. 
'-
The external financial situation of  the area is extremely weak.  This is particularly the 
case in  the short run while in  a longer term  perspective the new  states that. have 
succeeded the Sovie~ Union present rather variable profiles.  Some have considerable 
hard currency earning potential and industrial  capacity~ others are clearly close to 
developing countries arid will therefore strongly depend on external assistance. · 
The external financial situation of  the NIS is largely determined by the developments 
in the Soviet Union since the late eighties and, at present, by the questions related to 
the settlement of  the external debt problem. 
Since 1990, the only way the former Soviet Union was able to service its external 
debt, which was owed mainly to private creditors, was to cut back on imports and 
run  down its gold and  hard  currency reserves.  It made also an  extensive use of 
official  and  officially  guaranteed  credits  provided  by  the  main  industrialized 
countries.  However, in view of  the growing difficulties in  collecting hard currency 
resources, and the withdrawal of credit lines  with Western commercial banks, the  "' 
Vneshekonombank of the USSR had virtually to suspend payments at the end of 
1991.  In December 1991-January 1992, the authorities ofthe new-states concluded 
agreements  with  official  and  private creditors of the Soviet Union  on deferral  of 
, principal repayments on medium- and long-term  credits contracted prior to 1991. 
The agreements were based on the acceptance by the states of  the principle of  "joint 
and several liability" for the debt servicing. 
Despite the deferrals, the former Soviet Union's liquidity crisis did not ease in -1992. 
Furthermore,  the  legal  framework  of the  debt  servicing  based  on the joint  and 
several  liability  proved  not  workable  (Russia  was the  only  state to make  actual 
payments), and significant arrears (some $  12  billion,  including over $ 4 billion in 
interest  arrears)  have  accumulated  on  non-deferred  debt.  As  a  result,  the  debt 
I () 
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outstanding approached by  the end  of 1992  $  78  billion  (some  194% of Russia•s  ' -
exports in  1992), up from $ 67 billion a year earlier.  Following these developments;· 
the case for a longer-term  solution to the  debt-servicing  problem gairied  support.  · 
After lengthy negotiations, the Paris Club of official creditors agreed· in  early April 
1993  on  a comprehensive debt  rescheduling  package covering both principal  and 
interest payments on virtually all the credits extended to the former Soviet Union up 
to its break  -up at the end of 1991 : · 
The package. was negotiated with Russia which is  now viewed by  the creQitors as 
Virtually the sole successor of  the Soviet Union, with respect to its foreign liabilities. 
· For months,_ Russia has  been  seeking to take over all  the  former .Soviet  Union•s 
foreign  d~bt,  in  exchange  of its  assets,  through  the  so~called 
11Zero-opti~n
11 
. arrangements.  Ukraine, the second largest_former Soviet republic, has not agreed so 
far with this soll;ltion, but this did not prevent the creditors to agree with Russia on a 
comprehensive debt rescheduling.  The. Paris Club agreement and anticipated similar 
agreements· ,with  the  other  former  Soviet  Union•s  official  and  private  creditors 
(negotiations  with  the  London  Club  ~re ·underway)  are  expected to provipe 'an 
overall relief on debt servicing in  1993 of  some $30 billion (including the refinancing  . 
of  arrears), and _thus reduce debt servicing by Russia to less than $3.5 biUion, .  or just 
9% of projected  Russia•s  exports  in  1993 · (down  from  some  81% on due basis). 
Nevertheless, prospects for Russia•s external situation in  1993 are still uncertain and 
.  strong domestic macro-economic policies are required to limit the large capital flight 
and to allow for a  modest recovery of imports, necessary to slow down the .  output 
decline.  · 
L  FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 
All  succ~ssor republics to the former  Yugoslavia  are confronted with  comparable 
problems  : the transition  to a  market: economy  and  to  international  competition. 
Worsened by the collapse of former CMEA trade,  the effeCts  of the war. and  the 
.  boycott  of th~ir ·bilateral  relations,  have resulted  in . a  contraction  of output,  of 
employment, and increased inflation.  _The trade and current account deterioration is .  · · 
marked by  the sharp. contraction of  imports  (resulting froin  the  drop  in  domestic 
activity).  Furthermore, the widespread DM-ization of these inflationary economies 
and the provision of  large-scale humanitarian aid (in the case of Croatia ~nd Bosnia) 
make it particularly difficult to interpret balance ofpayments.developments. · 
The· successor republics are in the· process of discussing the division of internal and · 
external assets  and  liabilities  under. the aegis of the Peace Conference in  Geneva. 
These discussions were however progressively stalled at the beginning of 1993 as a 
-result of  the worsening of  the polical and military situation. 
.  .  . 
Yugoslavia•s  external debt amounting to ·s  16  bn  has already been  largely divided 
between the  successor  republics  except· for  a federal  part equal  to  $  3.1  billion, . 
guaranteed by- the National Bank of Yugoslavia,  and  largely  owed to commercial 
banks.  (The debt owed to commercial banks is equal to$ 4.7 billion, to international 
organizations$ 3.2 billion and to governments$ 5.5 billion).  ·  ·  · -31 -· 
·The Yugoslav debt was rescheduled in  1988 by the London and  Paris Clubs.  The 
agreements  included  grace  periods  through  1993  and  1994,  respectively.  Until 
March 1992, the entire debt was serviced by the National Bank ofYugoslavia ·and 
Slovenia for their respective parts in accordance with these agreements.  Since tnen, 
only Slovenia is  servicing its debt and the agreements will  have to be renegotiated 
with each republic. 
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) 
The Yugoslav economy and monetary system have practically collapsed due to the 
catastrophic effects of the civil war and  sanctions.  Real GPD is  estimated to have 
fallen by 20% in  1992 and by 35% since 1989.  The central bank funds nearly all the 
federal  budget  by  money  issue  and  has  consequently  lost  control  of the  money 
supply; inflation in 1992 reached 20,000%. 
During 1992, Yugoslav exports were approximately $2.5 bn (-46% over 1991) while 
imports reached$ 3.9 bn (-33% over 1991).  However the bulk of  this trade took 
place before July  1992,  when  most countries began to apply on  sanctions.  In  the 
first  quarter of 1993  imports  amounte_d  to $  386  million  and  exports  to $  249 
million.  The value of the dinar. has dwindled from  YD 130/$. in  May 1992 to YD 
580,000/$ a year later.  Only one quarter of  the labour force is employed full-time. 
The combined foreign  debt of the new republic is US$ 5.5 bn  pius its share of the 
federal  debt.  In  June  1992,  the  National· Bank  stopped  servicing· its  debt  to 
commercial banks.  It continued·ho.wever to make small payments to the IMF. 
Slovenia 
Slovenia was Yugoslavia's wealthiest and  most industrialized republic.  Output fell 
by 6.5% in  1992 (9.3% in  1991), mostly due to a large drop in industrial production 
(-13.0%).  However,  production  is  expected  to  stabilize  in  1993.  Retail  prices 
during 1992 rose by 200% over 1991  but the annual rate has now dropped to 47% 
during the first five months of 1993.  Unemployment was 14% ofthe labour force in 
April 1993 (13% in October 1993) .. 
Since  independence,  Slovenia has  implemented  drastic economic  refonns.  Prices 
and  foreign  exchange  operations  · have  been  liberalized,  the  banking  sector 
deregulated and the fiscal  system completely restructured.  Fiscal policy resulted  in 
small  surpluses  in  1991  and  1992.  Folio  wing  a  long  debate  in  Parliament,  a 
privatization law was passed in November 1992: · 
Slovenia has introduced its own currency and has maintained rigorous monetary and 
·fiscal  policies.  Foreign  currency  reserves  have  more  than  tripled  during  1992, 
reaching  $  1.2  bn  in  May  1993.  The  country  has  also  minimized  the  negative 
consequences ofthe loss of  the internal Yugoslav market by successfully reorienting 
its foreign trade activity.  During 1992 there was a small trade surplus ($ 0.1  billion) 
and a current account surplus of$ 0.9 billion. (J 
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Slovenia's share ofthe Yugoslav foreign dept is$ 1.7 .bn,  not including its part ofthe 
federal  debt .. The republic  had  continued to service its  debt without interruption 
until May 1992: · In June it refused to make payments to banks as long as the latter 
were  referring  to  payments  by  Yugoslavia  as  a· whole·  and  were  not  explicitly 
·acknowledging  that· Slovenia . had  paid  its  own .  share ·in  the  debt  by  itself.  In 
Novemb~r 1992,  Slovenia  regularized  its  situation.  · Banks are now beginning  to . 
negotiate with. Slovenia on the servicing of  the latter's part, in the-federal debt on th~ · 
. ·basis of  the allocation of  a part ofth~  Yugoslav quota in the IMF to Slovenia. 
. Croatia 
Croatia's economic performance continues to be adversely affected by the civil war. 
One· third  ofits territory  is  occupied and  the country is  flooded  by  Croatian  and 
B()snian refugees.  The tourist industry has c:ome to a standstill.  Real GDP deClined 
.by 25% dunng 1992, folloWing a 23.4~ drop in  1991.  This is mainly due to the fall 
.  · in  industrial  production and  in  tourism.  Retail  prices rose by 665% in  1992 over 
1991 ~  ~ecently inflation has been on  an  accelerati~g trend ( 1400% during the first 
four months of 1  ~93).  The rate of  unemployn:tent reached 18% in April 1993. 
·.  .  .  .  . 
Economic  reforms  were  at  a  very  eai-fy  stage  when  ciVil  war  broke. out.  The 
privatization law enacted in May 1991. has been widely criticized as inadequate, and 
there is an urgent need to streamlining the country's inefficient fiscal system. 
C~oatia showed a$ 0.3~bn trade defici,t  in  1992'($ 0.5  bn  in  1991) but a  curre~t · 
account surplus of$ 329 million (against a deficit of$ 590 million in  1991).  Foreign 
exchange reserves at the Central Bank stood at only $ 340 million in the end of  May  . 
1992 (against$ .I 70 million at th~ end ofDecemb~r f992).  ·  . 
The external debt is valued at $ 2.7 bn  plus Croatia's share in  the $ 3. r bn  federal 
debt.  As of  May 1992, Croatia ceased to· service its share of  the debt, alleging that 
part  of it  had  been  purchased  on  the· secondary  market  by  Serbia. .  Croatia  is 
presently trying to convince the conurierCial banks to form another consortium with 
a view .to re-negotiating a restructuring ofthe outstanding debt and interest arrears. 
The totaJ·debt attributable to the former yugoslav republic of  Macedonia is valued at 
.  . 
som~  $ I bn and that ofBosn:ia-Herzegovina at$ 2 bn. l 
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TABLE  1 
CAPITAL OUTSTANDING IN RESPECT OF OPERATIONS DISBURSED 
(in ECU million) 
Authorized  ·  Amount  Amount 
Operation  ceiling  outstanding  outstanding 
31.12.1992  30.6.1993 
--
MEMBER STATES 
A.  Balance of payments·  - 14000 
1. Greece I  721  200 
2. Greece II  1000  1000 
3.1taly  1979 
B. Other 
4. Euratom  4000  1338  1144 
5. NCI and NCI earthquakes  6830  3305  2813 
6. EIB Med-iterranean, 
Spain, Greece •  Port.  1500  645  629 
MEMBER STATES- TOTAL  26330  7009  77t>4 
THIRD COUNTRIES 
A.  Financial assistance 
1. Hungary  1050  710  790. 
2. Czechoslovakia  375  375  375 
3.  Bulgaria  400  290  290 
4: Romania  455  375  455 i 
5. Algeria  400  250  250 
6.-lsrael  160  160  160 
7. Baltic States  220  60 
8.  Former Soviet Union  1250  93  616 
a. Other 
9.  EIB Mediterranean  6017  1444  1532 
10. EIB Central and Eastern Europe  1700  147  179 
11. Guarantee, CIS  500  363  363 
THIHD COUNTRIES- TOTAL  12527  4207  5070 
GRANO TOTAL  38857  11216  12834 
,_ - 54  -
MAXIMUM ANNUAL RISK BORNE BY THE COMMUNITY BUDGET 
(Estlmat.ln ECU million based on all operatioM disbdnied at 341 June 1193) 
-
1193  19M  1915  1t96  1997  1998  1999' 
' 
MEMBER STATES 
-
CAPITAL 
A, Balance of paym8nts 
1. Greece  569  . 200  500  500 
2.ltaly  500 
a.  &cn~ccural loans 
3.Eurabtnt  358  101.  ...  152  885  11  18 
4. NCIIHid NCI EQ  11n  657.  484  321  528  t2  39 
5. EIB Mecl. Old. .Prot. 
8p. Or. Polt.  54  BO  83  n  71  S8  51 
Capital - subtatal  2158  10C8  613  t~  1111S  7.(1  to& 
IMTEREST 
A, Balance of  paymeids 
1.Greece  147  110  115  95  46  46 
2.ltaly  136  136.  138  ..  t6  88 
a._ saructuraltoans 
3.Euratum  112  80  72  68  55  10  - 3  .. 
4. NCI and Net EQ  216  186  131  91  6.(  16  8 
~· Ela MecL Old. Prot. 
Sp. Or. Polt.  31  50  42  34  r1  21  15 
lntelftt  - subtDtal  51!6  582  471  •.(24  288  1llll  122 
MEMBER STATES~  TOTAL  '  rl" 
1510  1089  .  197.(  ,..n  HI  228 
.. 
NON-MEMBER COIJNl"RMS 
CAPITAL 
A. Financial asl$taAce 
8.H~  3110  280  80  100 
7. Czechoslovalda  1911  1115 
8. Bulgaria ·'  1.4o  150 
I. Romania  186  180 
10. Algelta  250 
11.lsrNI  - 160 
12.Ex USSR  81  393  133 
13. aafuc States 
a:ouarantees  -
1.(. EIB Med.  58  127  134  131  133  138  130 
.. 
15. EIB Ct£  I!Jrr.  2.  .  11  18  20  21  11 
11. Aid, Russia liOOm  103  133  133 
.. 
Capital-sulmitat  ...  1$1  353  1020  542  974  ns  m 
INTE!REST 
A, Financial assistance 
. &.Hungary  . 81  81  81  44  ·18  tO 
1_. Czeehoslovalda  38  38  38  31  38  19 
B. Bulgaria  29  28  29  29  .28  15 
I.  Romania  42  46  46  46  46  46  27 
10.Aigerla  25  25  25  25  25' 
11.1sratf  1t  ,,  16  18  16 
12.Ex.USSR  30·  57  46  .7 
13. Baltic States  3  6  6  ·6  6:  I  6 
a. Guarantees 
14.EiaMed.  ,  &1  112  102  92  B2  72.  82 
15. E1B Ott! Eur.  8  15  1.(  13  12  10  • 
16. Aid, RUS$1a 500nl  34  :M  9 
lntllnst • subtotal  Jl1.  "' 
412  316  272  ;  178  1M 
, 
NON-MEMBER COUNTRIES-TOTAL  . 526  802.  1433  857  1245  154  443 
-
GRANDTO:rAL  :3270- 2412  2522  2832  2723  f884  871 
(ea.t.m l!uropel  368  &21  1158  i94  578  747  251 
(otlter IIOIHIIetnber countries)  158  -281  2n  284  -
207  112 
2UOO  TOTAL 
1769 
.1479  1971 
12  1361 
39  3337 
45  534 
1515  8980 
539  ...  ·m 
1  401 
5  797 
11  231 
113  2710 
1688  117.40 
.. . 
790 
375 
2!10 
80  455 
250 
160 
818 
60  60· 
119  1166 
17  108 
369 
m  ~ 
315. 
2e9 
180 
8  307 
125 
80 
1.40 
6  45 
$_~  635 
7  89 
87 
74  . 2171 
3$0  1610 
2038  19351 
179  4315 
171  _2216 - 35  -
MAXIMUM THEORETICAL ANNUAL RISK BORNE BY THE COMMUNITY BUDGET 
(Estimate In ECU million bl!sed on all operations disbursements, decisions and Commission proposals) 
1993  19M  1996  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  TOTAL 
MEMBER STATES 
CAPITAL 
A. Balanc:e of payments 
f. Greece  569  200  600  600  600  600  2969 
2. Italy  600  2000  3479  691'9 
B. Structunllloans 
3. Euratom + NCI  1635  758  630  473  1113  183  65  62  -4899 
4. EIB Sp. Gr. Port.  114  110  83  77  76  68  61  .Q  634 
Capital-subtotal  2168  10.Q  613  1560  1189  7.,  270&  4176  14181 
INTEREST  ) 
A. Balance ot  !)'JymeWo:l  ·-
1.Giftee  147  170  216  . 216  166  186  120  60  1259 
2.1taly  336  636  736  696  696  686  496  4192 
B  .. Structural loans  'f 
3. Euratom + NCt  <108  267  203  169  120  26  10  8  1199 
4. ElB Sp."Gr. Port.  31  60  42  34  27  21  16  11  231 
lnterW. -subtotal  686  823  996  .11~4  1009  . 909  841  673  6881 
MEMBER STATES ·TOTAL.  2744  1871  1609  2694  2188  1649  3647  4749  21063 
NOH-MEMBER COUNTRIES 
CAPITAL 
A. Financial assistance 
II. Hungary  360  260  80  360  1050 
6. Czechoslovakia  190  186  376 
1' Bulgaria  140  160  65  345 
B. Romania  186  190  80  456 
9.1srael  180  teo 
10. Algerta  260  160  400 
11.Ex USSf<  146  929  176  1260 
12. BaHic States  220  22o 
13. Euratom, C+E Eur.  10  23  37  70 
B. Guarantees 
14.1:1BMed.  66  127  134  167  225  aos  369  423  1806 
15. El8 C+E Eur.  2  11  40  86  161  225  300  814 
18.. EIB, other third countries  3  10  '23  40  76 
17. Aid, Russia, Guar.  600m  103  133  133  369 
Capital-subtotal  169  <108  1667  642  1133  1366  830  1306  7390 
INTEREST 
A. Financial assistance 
&.Hungary  81  107  107  70  " 
36  446 
6. Czechoslovakia  38  38  38  38  38  19  209 
7. Bulgaria  35  40  40  40  40  26  11  11  243 
8. Romania  42  "  "  " 
.ce  " 
27  8  307 
9.1srael  16  16  16  16  16  80 
10.Aiget1a  32  40  40  40  40  16  16  16  237 
11.Ex USSR  30  125  11:1  9  274 
12. Baltic States  11  22  22  22  22  22  22  22  165 
13. Euratom, C+E! Eur.  16  36  66  75  86  109  107  491 
B. Guarantees 
f 4. Em Mecl.  163  190  2C5  324  ll92  447  468  469  2679 
16. !IB C+E Eur.  19  " 
17  174  261  346  397  412  1761 
16. EIB, other .third countries  1  4  12  28  47  61  66  219 
17. Aid, Russia, Guar. 600m  34  24  t  67 
Interest • subtotal  491  710  809  848  1002  1098  1111  11110  7167 
NON-MEMBER COUNTRIES· TOTAL  660  1118  2366  1488  2135  2464  1941  24011  14657 
GRAHDTOTAL  33M  2990  3976  4182  4333  4103  1488'  7164  35820 
(Eastern europe)  393  7"  192'/  929  1021  1830  101M  1262  8900 
(Oltler ~countries)  1ST  •.  374  439  559  1114  824  837  1163  1657 ) 
0 
.  d  . 
~-
G 
EXPLANATORY NOTES 
The purpose of these tables is· to show the annmd  repayments of capital_ and· interest in 
respect  of borrowing  and  lending  ()peratjons  for  which  the  risk.  is .  covered  by  the 
Community _budget  The figures show the maXimum possible risk for the Coinmunity in 
respect of these operations and  must  not be  read  as  meaning that these amounts will 
actually be drawn from the budget.- In  the case of Table 3,  it is  not certain that all  the-
operations described will actually be disbursed.  No account has been taken ofintereston 
late payment or any additional costs such as lawyers' fees. 
I.  TYPES  OF  OPERATION  -AND  PAYMENT  OF·  THE  .BUDGET 
GUARANTEE 
A.  Types of  operation 
The risk covered by the Community budget results from two types ofoperation: 
- borrowingllending operations;  -
- guar~ntees  giv~n to third parties. 
In the first type of operation, the Community borrows on the financial  market and  on.,. 
lends the proceeds (at the same rate and for the same term) to Member States (balance of 
payments),  non-member countries  (medium-term  financial· assistance)  or firms  (NCI, 
Euratom). ·  · 
The loan repayments are scheduled to match the r~payments of  the borrowings due from _ 
the Community.  If the recipient of the loan defaults, the Commission must draw on its 
budgetary resources to repay the borrowing on the due date.  · 
The. loan  guarantee  is  in  respect  of loans  granted  l;>y  a  financial  instituti"n -(Effi  or 
commercial  banks in  the case of the ·former ·Soviet 'Union).  When· the recipient  of a 
guaranteed loan fails to make a payment on the due date, the bank asks the Commission 
to p~y  the amounts owed by the defaulter.  ' 
B.  Mobilization offunds 
_  The funds needed can be raised by re-using amounts repaid or by means of  transfers.  ..•  .  ..  - .  .  '  . 
The re-use of amounts repaid  by debtors  allows  pa}'ments  to be made withid a  short 
period of  time always proViding, of  course, that there are funds available for re-use.  -
.  - .  '  .  . 
Where there· are  insuffici¢nt  funds  for  re-use  or insufficient  time  for  a  transfer,  the  · 
amount  required  will  be  taken  provisionally· from  cash  re~ources with  an  adjustment 
being  rriade  later by  means  of a  transfer  and/or a  supplementary/amending budget  as_ 
appropriatt:.  - ·  - -
II.  CALCULATION 
- __ some of the  ~mounts indicated  are  the  result or estimates  mad.e  on the basis  ~r  the 
following assumptions.  ·  -- ·  · --37-
operations should not involve exchange risks for the Community.  Unless otherwise stated, 
the average rate of  interest is estimated at 10%.  This rate is probably a little high for Em 
loans, which often .attract interest subsidies under the protocols. 
A.  Member States 
L  Greece  1:  The figures  for  repayments of capital  and  fixed:..rate  interest  are  final  and 
certain. 
2.  ·Greece II:  A total ofECU 2.2 billion has been granted and the first tranche of 
ECU 1 billion has actually been disbursed.  Half of  this tranche is repayable in 1996 and 
the other half in  1998.  The second and third tranches ofECU 600 million will be paid 
only if  Greece makes a formal request for them and if  the Council endorses the 
favourable conclusions of  the Commission's examination of  the outcome ofthe 
Government's economic programme.  For the purposes of  this exercise, however, it is 
assumed that the second tranche will be disbursed in 1993 and the third tranche in 1994, 
both with a term of. six years.  This assumption will have to be verified in due course. 
3.  Italy:  The first tranche ofECU 2 billion out of  the total ofECU 8 billion was paid out in 
the first half of 1993; ECU 500 million is repayable in 1996 and the equivalent of 
DM 2 900 million in 2000.  It was assumed that the second tranche ofECU 2 billion 
would be paid in the second half of 1993, as indeed it was, to be repaid in 1999.  The 
Council Decision granting the loan to Italy states that the third and fourth tranches of 
ECU 2 billion cannot be releas.ed before_ 1 February 1994 and 1 February 1995 
respectively and then only if an examination by the Commission shows that the measures 
necessary to achieve the annual budget targets to be set have actually been implemented 
and if  the Council endorses this conclusion.  The uncertainties surrounding these 
procedures have not been taken into consideration for the purposes of  this exercise and it 
is assumed that the third tranche will be paid in 1994, to be repaid in 2000, and that the 
fourth tranche will be paid in 1995, to be repaid in 2001.  This assumption will have to be 
verified in due course. 
4.  Em.  Mediterranean.  old  protocols:  Spain,  Greece.  Portugal:  These are Community 
guarantees for Em operations in these countries prior to accession.  The amounts are 
now final,  since all the loans authorized have been disbursed. 
B.  Non-member countries 
a.  Financi<d assistance 
1.  Hungary I:  The amounts of the first two tranches are final  and certain.  It is  assumed 
that the third tranche will be paid in 1993 for a five-year term. 
2.  Hungary II:  ECU 180 million has been granted in two tranches and paid out in full. 
3.  Czechoslovakia:  ECU 375 million h.as been granted in two tranches for a maximum term 
pf seven years (bullet), with a first tranche of ECU 185 million. and a second tran~he of 
ECU 190 million for a term of  six yeais. 
'  ' () 
.(; 
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4.  Bulgaria:  ECU 290 million  has been granted .in  two tranches for  a  maximum term of 
seven years (bullet),  with a first  tranche of ECU 150 million  and a  seeond tranche of 
ECU 140 million for a term of  six years.  · 
.The new operation involving ECU 110 million for a maximum term· of seven years to be 
paid in two tranches in 1993 for a term of seven years and the second in  1994.with.the 
sanie term. 
5.  Romania:  An estimated ECU 375 rnillion in· two trariches for a maximum term of seven. 
years (bullet).  ·The first tranche of ECU 190 million was disbursed in  1992 with a term· 
of  seven years _and the second was disbursed in 1992 with a t~rm of  six years.  · ·  ' 
The new operation involving· ECU 80 million for a maximum  term of seven years  was 
disbursed in 1993. · 
6.  Bciltic States  . 
·  It is assumed that this loan of  ECU 220 million will be paid in full in two tranches in the 
course of 1993 and repaid in one tranche seven years later. 
7  .·  Algeria:  · ECU 400 million  has  been granted  in  two tranch¢s  of ECU 250 million  and 
ECU 150 million.  The first  was paid  in  December 1991  for  a term. of six  years:  it  is 
assumed that the second will be paid in  1993 for a term of  six years. . . 
8.  Israel:  A loan of  ECU 160 million has been paid in full. andis repayable in  1997 . 
.  b.  Guarantees . 
-I. Em 
Figures provided by the Em for loans disbursed at 30 Junel9~3. 
For the others, we have made the following assumptions concerning the signature ofloans. · 
Year 
Mediterranean countries 
Central and Eastern Europe  2 
·Other non-member £ountries 
1993 
800 
800 
50 
. 1994 
850 
'  765 
150 .· 
1995 
850 
965 
250 
1996  TOTAL 
900 
1270 
250 
3400 
3800 
700 
In  the case of these loans and  those already  signed  at  the end  of June 1993  bufnot yet  . 
disbursed (ECU 1· 04 3 .  million for· the Mediterranean countries and ECU 566 million for the 
countries of  Central and Eastern Europe), we have assumed that an average of 10% of the 
loan will be disbursed in the year of signature and 30% in each of the three following years. 
In the case of  the new operations following the renewal of  Em loans of ECU 3 000 million 
in the countries of  Central and Eastern Europe for a period of  tlrre~ years, it  is assumed that 
the  signatures  will  take  place  as  indicated  in  the· financial  statement  drawn  up  by  the 
Commission.  ·  · 
.  :  . 
It is estimated that the average term will be fifteen years with a three-year period of  grace. · 
- ' 
.. 
· 2.  Food aid for the former Soviet Union 
2  Including renewal from  1993. - 39-
(a)  Guarantee 
This is a guarantee for a bank loan of  ECU 500 million, fully covered by the budget, with a 
· term of three and a  half years with three repayments at ,intervals of eleven months starting 
from the twentieth month.  · 
(b)  Borrowingllending 
An operation involving ECU 1 250 million for a maximum term of  three years. 
This borrowing will  be divided between the various Republics of the former Soviet Union. 
Loans amounting to less than ECU 100 million will be repaid in one instalment three years 
after the  start  of the  period in  which  the  funds  may  be  drawn.  Borrowings exceeding 
ECU I 00 million will be repaid in two instalments two years and three years after the start 
of  the period in which the funds may be drawn. 
Depending on the type of  contract, there are two periods in which funds may be drawn;  one 
starts on 20 August, the other on 15 January. 
3.  Euratom, countries of  Central and Eastern Europe 
Of the ECU 1 124 million involved, it is assumed that ECU 300 million will  be disbursed in 
1993, ECU 224 million in 1994 and ECU 200 million in each of  the three following years. 
It is  assumed that the loans will  be for an  average term of twenty years. with a five-year 
period of  grace. -40-
ANNEX 
· DEFINITION OF FIGURES USED IN THE REPORT 
A.  · Authorized ceiling (Table I) 
:!'' 
.  '  .  . 
This is the .aggregate of  the maximum amounts of capital authorized·(  ceilings) for each 
operation decided  or of the  amount  proposed  by  the  Commission  for  operations  for-· 
which there has not yet been a Council decision. 
In order to relate it to the -risk which the budget might  h~ve to cover; account should be 
taken of  the interest, which would increase the figure~ and of three factors which would 
reduce it: 
- limitation  of the  guarantee  given  to  the  Effi  to 75%  of the  loans  signed  in  the 
. Mediterranean countries; 
- . operations already repaid, since the amounts concerned, except in the case of  balance 
of payments support, are the maxim(Jm amount of loans granted-and not outstanding 
amounts authorized;  ·  ·  · 
- the amounts authorized are not necessarily taken up in full. 
The breakdown of  authorizations is. as follows: 
·_  Member States 
Balance of  payments 
NCI 
Euratom 
Effi; Spain, Greece, Portugal 
Member States - total 
.  . 
14 000  3  .  . 
6 830 
4 '000  4 
I 500 
. 26 330' 
· 3  Authorized amo~nt  outstanding:  once this figure isreached, further loans may be granted as 
previous operations are repaid. · 
4 .  Including ECU 1 li4 million which may be granted to the countries of Eastern Europe and the CIS. Non-member countries 
Hungary I 
Hungary II 
Czechoslovakia 
Bulgaria I 
Bulgaria II 
Romania I 
Romania II 
Israel 
Algeria 
fonner Soviet Union I 
fonner Soviet Union IJ 
Baltic States 
Em, old protocols 
Em, Eastern Europe I 
Em, Eastern Europe II 
Em, Baltic States 
Effi,Albania 
Em, new protocols 
Em, horizontal cooperation 
Other non-member countries 
Non-member countries - total 
Grand total 
B.  Amount outstanding (Table 1) · 
-41 -
870 
180 
375 
290 
110 
375 
ao 
160 
400 
408 
1 250 
220 
3 032 
1 700 
2 750 
200 
50 
1 185 
1 800 
750 
16 185 
42 515 
This is  the amount of capital still to be repaid on a given date in respect of operations 
disbursed.  · 
Compared with the previous aggregate, the amount outstanding does not include .loans 
which have  not yet been disbursed  nor the  proportion of disbursed  loans  which  have 
already been repaid.  It may be described as the amotmt of loans which exist on a given 
date.  · 
C.  Annual risk 
Estimated amount of  principal and interest due each financial year. 
This amount is calculated for: 
- disbursements alone (Table 2), in which. case the capital to be repaid corresponds to 
the amount outstanding; 
- disbursements,  decisions still  awaiting disbursement and Commission  proposals still 
awaiting decisions (Table 3), in which case the capital to be repaid :orresponds to the 
ceiling  on  loans  authqrized  plus,  where  applicable,  the  amounts  in  respect  of 
operations proposed by the Commission and not yet decided and the amount still to be 
used for balance of payments operations which are much less likely to be called on 
than the other types of  assistance. 
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